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The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) was enacted to 
improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the federal 
government and to initiate program performance improvement.  The purpose of this 
project was to determine if GPRA initiatives have lead to indications of material 
performance improvements within three specific executive agencies.  The agencies 
chosen were performing at different levels of effectiveness, according to the performance 
and accountability scorecard produced by the Mercatus Center at George Mason 
University, a non-governmental citizen advocacy center. 
The analysis examined performance plans, performance reports and strategic 
plans from the previous five years.  The intent was to determine if the reports indicated 
improvements in program effectiveness and accountability over the five year evaluation 
period.  An evaluation tool was constructed to create a performance matrix based on the 
raw data in the agencies’ annual performance and accountability reports.  Four 
customized measures were used to evaluate the agencies’ performance from year to year. 
The results of the analysis indicated material performance improvements in one of 
the three agencies.  Analysis revealed the other two agencies did not clearly indicate 
improvement in performance effectiveness.  Evidence of improved program effectiveness 
and accountability inferred that these improvements may relate to the transparency and 
accountability requirements of GPRA.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In 1993, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was enacted to 
improve government performance.  The purpose of this act is to:     
• Improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the 
Federal Government, by systematically holding Federal agencies 
accountable for achieving program results.  
• Initiate program performance reform with a series of pilot projects in 
setting program goals, measuring program performance against those 
goals, and reporting publicly on their progress.   
• Improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by 
promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer 
satisfaction.   
• Help Federal managers improve service delivery, by requiring that they 
plan for meeting program objectives and by providing them with 
information about program results and service quality.  
• Improve congressional decision making by providing more objective 
information on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative 
effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending.  
• Improve internal management of the Federal Government.1   
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This project aims to answer a simple question--“Have the performance and 
accountability reports required by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) 
of 1993 and submitted by agencies during the last five years revealed material 
improvements in program effectiveness and public accountability through reported 
results?”     
To answer that question, the team examined the performance plans, performance 
reports and strategic plans for three federal agencies from the previous five years.  The 
process indicated whether or not each agency improved its program effectiveness and 
accountability over the five year evaluation period.  An indication of material 
                                                 
1 Office of Management and Budget. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/gplaw2m.html, (accessed May 16, 2007). 
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improvement may infer that the transparency and accountability required by GPRA led to 
improved effectiveness in the agency.  This research project’s methodology and findings 
may prove useful for future research on performance improvement and operational 
effectiveness within the government. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This project will analyze five years (2002 through 2006) of performance plans, 
performance reports, and strategic plans submitted by three Federal agencies to identify 
improvements in program effectiveness and accountability.  The Department of Veterans 
Affairs, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Interior were 
chosen for this study.  The choice was based on the agencies’ standings in the Mercatus 
Center’s Annual Performance Report Scorecard summary and rankings for fiscal year 
2006.  The organizations represented the top, middle and lower tier of the rankings.  The 
discussion of effectiveness and accountability was based on definitions provided by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  On its website, OMB defined effectiveness 
as “agencies making programs work better every year.”2  OMB stated accountability is 
“doing what you said you would do.”3  Specific focus sections within the reports include 
Strategic Goals, Goal Objectives, and Performance measures.  The costs related to goal 
accomplishment were also included in the analysis. 
C. TWENTIETH CENTURY GOVERNMENT REFORM INITIATIVES 
The United States federal government has made several attempts since the turn of 
the twentieth century to better align spending decisions with expected performance.  Past 
administrations and congress were moderately instrumental in establishing a management 
framework of performance budgeting that set future expectations for federal agencies to 
improve in several aspects: 1) accurate/stronger financial reporting and internal controls,  
2) producing closely linked cost to performance information, and 3) providing transparent 
                                                 
2 Office of Management and Budget. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/gplaw2m.html, (accessed May 16, 2007). 
3 Office of Management and Budget. The Budget for Fiscal Year 2004. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/PART, (accessed November 1, 2007). 
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performance reports that legislators and taxpayers could audit.4  Leadership saw the need 
for agencies to clarify their strategic and operational objectives; and notionally 
developing outcome measures that demonstrated likely achievement toward those 
objectives.5 
Government reform initiatives are not new; since the creation of government there 
have been reforms of every kind, several attempting to establish a credible framework for 
performance-based budgeting.  However, few were born of radically new ideas with most 
consisting of only new approaches to same complex problems.  The initiatives of the 20th 
century date back to 1910 when the Taft administration formed the Commission on 
Economy and Efficiency; a time period in which there were no official executive 
budgeting requirements at the national level.  The commission produced a report in 1912 
entitled The Need for a National Budget and made several major recommendations which 
became the fundamental backbone for the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921—
initiating the modern-day attention to performance budgeting.6  The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) contends that U.S. government performance reform has 
occurred in five distinctively phased periods: 1) early 1900 reforms during, before and 
after the Taft administration, 2) management reform of the New Deal and post-WWII 
period, 3) performance and budget planning of the 1960s, 4) budget prioritization of the 
1970s and 1980s and 5) accountability reform beginning in the 1990s and continuing to 
present day.  Since World War II (WWII) there have been four notable government-wide 
efforts at creating the necessary management controls that would establish meaningful 
application between agency planned objectives and results:  1) Hoover Commissions 
following government downsizing post WWII , 2) Planning Programming Budgeting 
(PPBS) implementation in 1965 under the Johnson administration, 3) Management By 
                                                 
4 Defenselink. OSD Comptroller iCenter. “Performance Budgeting,” 2007, 2. 
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/icenter/budget/perfbudg.htm, (accessed September 11, 2007). 
5 Ken S. Cavalluzzo and Christopher D. Ittner, “Implementing performance measurement innovations: 
evidence from government,” Science Direct, Accounting, Organization, and Society 29 (2004), 243-244. 
6 Cozzettom Kewit and Kweit, 1995: 20-21; in Tyler and Willand, Public Budgeting in America: A 
Twentieth Century Retrospective, 189. 
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Objectives (MBO) of 1973 under the Nixon administration, and 4) Zero-Base Budgeting 
(ZBB) initiatives by the Carter administration in 1977.7 
1. Hoover Commission 
The first Hoover Commission, established statutorily by congress and officially 
titled the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, was 
chaired by then former President Hoover.  Hoover strongly believed the government 
could operate more economically and efficiently.  His commission was an effort to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness by shifting focus away from government inputs to a 
focus on its delegated functions, activities, tasks, and accomplishments.  Instead of 
emphasizing expenditure items as past practice dictated, performance budgets were to 
describe specific outputs that resulted from specific functions/activities.8  The 
commission delivered its first reports and recommendations to the Truman administration 
and Congress in 1949.   
Efforts of the first commission resulted in an extensive reorganization of the 
executive branch.  Congress subsequently enacted the Budget and Account Procedures 
Act of 1950, which required the President to submit his administration’s budget 
submission to congress in the form of functions and activities of government; establishing 
a fundamental change in view of budget controls to obligation via activities.  Previously, 
less than half of all budgets contained obligation by activity.  Not different from today, 
the act required presidential budget presentations to describe, in narrative summaries, 





                                                 
7 United States, General Accounting Office (GAO), “Performance budgeting: Past Initiative Offer 
Insights for GPRA Implementation,” March 1997, 4-5, http://www.gao.gov/ archive/1997/ai97046.pdf, 
(accessed September 11, 2007). 
8 Dennis Bilger and Randy Sowell, October 2001, The Hoover Commission Special Subject Guide, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hoover/hoover.htm, (accessed June 24, 2007). 
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program activities.  The 1950 act was, in essence, the government’s first model for 
performance budgeting that provided a means for public review and scrutiny of federal 
spending outputs.9  
Overall, according to GAO, the Commission’s impact led to positive permanent 
changes to how the legislative and executive branches conducted affairs of government 
management. Within the first commission’s nineteen reports were two hundred and 
seventy recommendations targeting reorganization at the Executive Branch; it is 
estimated that one hundred and ninety-six were implemented to some degree by 
Congress.10  President Truman’s administration immediately implemented commission 
recommendations for performance-based budget controls within the FY 1951 President 
Budget.  Prior to 1951, less than forty-five percent of executive agency budgets included 
activity obligation data.  After 1951, all budgets provided 1) a listing of all programs 
and/or activities, 2) narrative summary statements of program performance for each 
account, 3) separate operating and capital expenditure data, 4) breakouts of grants and 
fixed charges.11 
In a separate context, by virtue of their recommendations and congressional buy-
in, many believe the first commission was instrumental in expanding the institution of the 
presidency by concentrating greater management control (power and authority) for the 
President and agency chiefs.  Additionally, the Hoover Commission began an era of 
enactment and reliance upon “study commissions” to address high profile and complex 
issues.   
2. Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) 
“A credible record of achievement,”12 words of President Johnson in January of 
1965, described the nation’s economic performance.  However, with the nation’s debt 
                                                 
9 United States, General Accounting Office (GAO), “Performance budgeting: Past Initiatives Offer 
Insights for GGPRA Implementation,” March 1997, 30-34, http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ai97046.pdf, 
(accessed September 11, 2007). 
10 Ibid., 30. 
11 Ibid., 31. 
12 Ibid., 35. 
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surpassing the $7B threshold (1.3 percent of GDP), there was concern the nation needed 
more modernized management tools capable of controlling these macro-economic 
centerpieces.  Shortly after his statement, the President, at the advice of his economic 
advisors, ordered implementation of the PPBS in all government agencies.  The move 
was hailed by outsiders as a breakthrough in the government decision-making processes.  
The President saw PPBS as a management tool for controlling programs and budgets 
rather than letting them control management.  It attempted to integrate planning and 
budgeting functions (a novel idea at the time) through two analysis tools—1) modern 
systems and 2) cost benefit analysis to evaluate alternatives, costs, and consequences. 
The Administration hoped that PPBS could inject the notion of rational decision-
making for allocating limited government resources.13  PPBS was a decision-making 
framework for the budget formulation process (executive branch side) by analyzing long 
term policy objectives for alternate ways of achievement.  Proponents of the system 
assumed efficiency improvements could be achieved through a universal approach for   
1) establishing long-term planning objectives, 2) analysis via cost/benefit for alternative 
means of accomplishment, and 3) translating agency programs into budget and legislative 
proposals of a long-term nature. 
Multi-year planning at the heart of the system was based on agency program 
structure.  It was responsible for providing statements of national need, and it equipped 
decision-makers with different approaches to filling those needs.  In August of 1965, 
President Johnson publicly announced the following three major objectives expected to 
be achieved: “1) It will help us find new ways to do jobs faster, to do jobs better, and to 
do jobs less expensively.  2) It will insure a much sounder judgment through more 
accurate information, pinpointing those things that we ought to do more, spotlighting 
those things that we ought to do less. 3) It will make our decision-making process as up-
to-date, I think, as our space-exploring program.”14 
                                                 
13 Stanley B. Botner, “Four Years of PPBS: An Appraisal,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 30, 
No. 4 (July-August 1970), 423-431. 
14 Ibid., 37. 
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The administration’s methodology for government-wide implementation in 1961 
was significantly different than previously attempted by the Department of Defense 
(DoD).  Though DoD required hundreds of analysts and contractors and more than ten 
years of study to implement PPBS, its government-wide implementation was planned to 
be completed in only six months.15 
Four years after its official implementation, the Bureau of Budget (BoB) and 
other agencies were struggling to comply with PPBS.  Researchers concluded, through a 
study of its implementation and utilization in sixteen agencies, that program planning, 
programming, and budgeting functions were carried out much the same as before PPBS 
introduction.  Additionally, studies assessing PPBS policy as an instrument for BoB to 
carry out its responsibilities (formulation of a federal budget) to the President revealed 
that it was relatively ineffectual.16  
Opposite of how it arrived, with fanfare and optimism, PPBS was formally 
discontinued in 1966 with little press or explanation.  Many critics, internal and external 
to the government, place responsibility for its failure on the implementation process in 
two different areas.  One was the overly compressed timeframe of six months for full 
government-wide implementation, compared to DoD’s ten year deliberate plan.  The 
other was how it was indiscriminately implemented--with agencies incapable of self 
guidance and BoB lacking the core competencies to steer them down the right path.  Still 
other critics cite the program’s lack of support because of its material balance of power 
shift between the executive and legislative branches.17  
One problem that plagues implementers of performance-based budgeting today, 
as in the past, is the effective development of proper measurement techniques and 
analysis tools that yield adequate data appropriate for inclusion in the decision making 
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process.  The GAO cited difficulty in linking output measures with program benefits.  
Management oversight of federal programs can be construed as unstable and impulsive, 
and controls are sometimes seen as loose and sporadic, making it difficult to determine 
relevant outputs.18 
Congress voiced concerns about the PPBS failure by questioning the program’s 
intent to become the government’s conclusive decision-making tool, given the broader 
assumptions needed to process analysis outcome.  Congress also expressed concern over 
the lack of access to PPBS documents that were intended to aid the resource allocation 
process.19 
Federal agencies saw the main obstacle to the success of PPBS as political discord 
related to resource allocation.  Many viewed PPBS analysis as handicapped when used to 
augment or replace the political process in more difficult areas of government such as 
foreign policy—an area where systems analysis becomes less useful.  Another problem 
PPBS failed to consider was the differing and sometimes polarizing views of our 
government’s decision makers—an unintended or, to some, intended consequence of 
democracy. 
In a positive light, the GAO recognized PPBS as instilling institutional 
improvement in program management.  During the process, agencies were forced to  
1) analyze their missions and functions, 2) look closely at how inputs related to outputs 
and mission achievement, and 3) get senior leadership involved at lower levels in 
planning, programming and budgeting for their respected missions.20  PPBS 
indoctrinated decision makers to system analysis and its uses pertaining to linkage of 
inputs, outputs, and costs.  This consequence would prove helpful in future management 
reform initiatives.      
                                                 
18 United States, General Accounting Office (GAO), “Performance budgeting: Past Initiatives Offer 
Insights for GGPRA Implementation,” March 1997, 39, http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ai97046.pdf, 
(accessed September 11, 2007). 
19 Ibid., 38-39. 
20 United States, General Accounting Office (GAO), “Performance budgeting: Past Initiatives Offer 
Insights for GGPRA Implementation,” March 1997, 40, http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ai97046.pdf, 
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3. Management by Objective 
George S. Odiorne, director of the Bureau of Industrial Relations at University of 
Michigan defines MBO as “the system of management by objectives can be described as 
a process whereby the superior and subordinate managers of an organization jointly 
identify its common goals, define each individual's major areas of responsibility in terms 
of the results expected of him, and use these measures as guides for operating the unit 
and assessing the contribution of each of its members.”21  MBO was popularized by Peter 
Drucker in the early 1950’s, over the next several decades it found its way through the 
corporate world and eventually landed, as several management improvement theories 
have, in the arms of the federal government.22  Generically, MBO is a substitute for 
management’s failure to outline and agree with employees what the organization is trying 
to achieve.23  MBO’s formal introduction to 95 percent of government management was 
in April, 1973 as President Nixon sought to gain greater administrative control over 
major Executive Branch departments and agencies.  It had been previously set up at the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and showed positive signs of achieving 
the President’s desired results—centralizing goal-setting decision and decentralizing goal 
achievement by allowing managers to determine the methods they used to achieve goals.  
A key element in MBO was enabling of management to track progress toward agreed 
upon goals.  
President Nixon issued the memorandum order to 21 agencies: “I am now asking 
each department and agency head to seek a sharper focus on the results which the various 
activities under his or her direction are aimed at achieving…This conscious emphasis on 
setting goals and then achieving results will substantially enhance federal program 
performance.”24 
                                                 
21 George S. Odiorne, Management by Objectives (New York: Pitman, 1965), 55. 
22 John J. Tarrant, Drucker, the Man Who Invented the Corporate Society, Boston: Cahners Books, 
1976, 78. 
23 Roger A. Golde, Muddling Through: The Art of Properly Unbusinesslike Management (New York: 
AMACOM, 1976), 71-72. 
24 United States, General Accounting Office (GAO), “Performance budgeting: Past Initiatives Offer 
Insights for GPRA Implementation,” March 1997, 42 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ai97046.pdf, 
(accessed September 11, 2007). 
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Foresight or not, the President had three years earlier proposed changing the BoB 
into the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), tasking it to give greater attention to 
federal management of programs than previously realized under BoB.  Was he attempting 
to take advantage of lessens learned during the PPBS attempt?  OMB was given full 
responsibility for implementation and progress of MBO.  As point agency, OMB 
proceeded to create new positions known as management associates (responsible for 
working daily with agencies in defining objectives and tracking progress among other 
duties) to assist agencies with their implementation, a critical measure overlooked by 
BoB during PPBS implementation.   
With a goal of identifying 100 “presidential objectives” each agency was asked to 
provide 10 to 15 of its most important objectives to be accomplished within the next year.  
Close communication occurred between each agency and OMB as they met in person 
every two months to discuss progress.  Links between agency budgets and presidential 
objectives were not realized in MBO’s inaugural year due in part to the OMB and the 
agencies intense focus on simply getting MBO procedures in place and a system of 
establishing objectives clear and efficient enough for linkage to agency budgets. 
MBO was clearly more accepted by federal agencies because it offered the 
flexibility that was lacking in the previously attempted PPBS process.  Despite its wide 
acceptance, the program fell short on several goals.  First, only 18 of 21 agencies 
complied with having a tracking system for objectives by the end of year one.  Second, 
management conferences didn’t occur as often as expected, leaving periods of up to six 
months between conferences for some agencies.  On several occasions conferences were 
scheduled, but thereafter cancelled.  Third, the dedicated management associates had 
become too involved in other tasks, such as special studies, to fully address MBO issues.  
Lastly, with the resignation of President Nixon in 1974, MBO’s sponsorship had trickled 
to a halt, leaving President Ford with yet another half-heartedly implemented 
management system.25 
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The MBO initiative’s short life span has been attributed to its initial separation 
from the formal budget process and the problems encountered in identifying and 
measuring objectives.  Agencies found the task of focusing on results and expressing 
them through measurable data simply too difficult to accomplish.  Agency objectives 
were also so vague they were immeasurable.26  On the positive side, MBO remained as a 
primary/secondary management tool for many state and local governments throughout 
the 1980’s.  The initiative bridged a gap that existed between the President’s national 
agenda and the public.  Like PPBS, MBO helped agencies clarify goals and objectives 
and enabled them to use it as an internal management tool that led to extensive employee 
empowerment.27   
4. Zero-Based Budgeting 
Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) in the federal government was an initiative of 
President Carter shortly after his 1977 inauguration.  Federal spending was out of control 
primarily due to permanent entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicare and 
multi-year budget authority.  The annual deficit was reaching post WWII levels and had 
reached a height of $73.8M in 1976.28 
As a candidate for the presidency, Jimmy Carter promised to balance the budget 
and engender fiscal reform for the federal budget system.  He saw the current system as 
“inefficient, chaotic, and virtually uncontrollable by either the President or the 
Congress.”29  His promise was to establish a ZBB system, a system he was familiar with 
as the Governor of Georgia. 
Under ZBB, agencies would be required to compete for funding by starting from 
an equal base of zero rather than from previous year’s funding.  The system required 
agencies to build packages known as decision units as a basis for their funding requests.  
                                                 
26  United States, General Accounting Office (GAO), “Performance budgeting: Past Initiatives Offer 
Insights for GGPRA Implementation,” March 1997, 44, http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ai97046.pdf, 
(accessed September 11, 2007). 
27 Ibid., 45. 
28 Ibid., 46. 
29 Ibid. 
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These decision units would provide a thorough evaluation of proposed program activities 
including funding, goals, objectives and what if scenarios based on different levels of 
funding.  The President’s mandated use of the process was holistic in that his intent was 
to completely replace the existing system from the bottom, up.  
Unlike PPBS and MBO, OMB did not create new support positions for ZBB as 
existing managers and budget specialist were expected to spearhead the implementation 
themselves.  Perhaps this was an unwise decision given a review of lessons learned from 
the previous initiatives.  Unfortunately, the lack of specialized staffers and 
implementation guidance from OMB was seen as a major impediment to the process.  For 
example, some agencies were focused on their accounting structure’s linkage to their 
decision units, while other agencies linked systems to program activities.30 
Observers noted disappointment in ZBB’s first year’s budget products as few 
agencies identified significant budget action.  The workload spent on preparing the 
budgets under the ZBB process was also called into question.  Budget year justifications 
continued to be prepared using ZBB, but justifications to Congress had reverted back to 
the previous year’s method.  Following suit, the Carter administration paid less attention 
to the budget process in general.31  In 1981, OMB rescinded Circular A-115, the 
requirement for agencies to maintain a ZBB system. 
So what survived the ZBB campaign?  Agencies continued to identify and 
prioritize “decision units” until 1986.  OMB continued to require agencies to identify 
multiple funding level plans until 1994.32  Participants and observers credited ZBB with 
instilling definite program efficiencies that arose from the processes analysis of 
alternatives.  
These initiatives, while broad stroking and high-profiled, are but a few of the 
overall attempts at transforming the federal government into a more efficient and 
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effective machine.  The PPBS was introduced with great expectations of transforming the 
system; however, it was formally discontinued only five years after government-wide 
implementation.  Observers cited many problems with the system as a whole such as the 
users’ ability to develop measuring and analysis techniques, the chasm of power formed 
between the executive and legislative branches, and the systems supporters’ failure to 
garner broad based support and training for the program before implementation.  MBO 
followed a similar path of failure, suffering in utility as a separate budget system in the 
initial formulation stages.  ZBB may have been implemented, but it faltered due to the 
excessive paperwork burden it placed on federal managers.  The burden led agencies to 
hastily compose performance packages containing arbitrary data and unverifiable 
measurements. 
Congress and the executive branch have worked on various other targeted 
attempts at reform; a piecemeal approach has proven to be the path of least resistance for 
leadership.  It is probable that there will always be stakeholders on both sides of a 
proposal who can agree only that reform is needed, but not on the means of achievement.  
Many attempts of reform have been tried, some with moderate successes and others 
offering less effective results.  As long as government leadership continues to recognize 
inadequacies in its management and budget systems, then there is potential for overall 
improvements in governmental fiscal systems. 
D. THE MOVE TOWARDS PERFORMANCE BUDGETING 
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) is a control / 
reform system that requires federal agencies to create and update strategic plans, 
performance plans, and performance reports.  The purpose of GPRA is to improve the 
confidence of the American people in the capability of the federal government, initiate 
program performance reform, improve effectiveness and service delivery, and improve 
internal management of the federal government.33 
                                                 
33 Office of Management and Budget, “Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,” 2-4, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/gplaw2m.html, (accessed September 24, 2007). 
 14
Performance budgeting can be narrowly defined as a form of budgeting that 
relates funds allocated funds to output and /or outcome results.34 
The link between GPRA and performance budgeting was instituted through OMB 
circular A-11, which directed agencies to prepare performance budgets in lieu of the 
annual performance plans that satisfy all statutory requirements of the superceded annual 
performance plan.35  This step now forces federal agencies to set realistic measurable 
plans and link these plans to their budget.  The performance report is an agency self-
evaluation of how well it is doing at meeting its planned performance budget.  This 
process, in theory, should allow the transparency necessary for individuals outside the 
agency to make a determination of whether an agency is doing what it said it would do 
and doing it effectively. 
1. Control vs. Performance Budgets 
The budgeting system within the federal government has been more of a control 
budget where the incentives are negative in nature, where non-use or misuse of funds can 
result in a lower appropriation in successive years or personal penalties.36  “The incentive 
structure of the control budget is such that public managers are penalized for identifying 
and implementing cost-saving techniques.”37  There is no incentive to strive for cost 
savings, indeed many managers attempt to deplete all available funds in order to justify 
an equal or larger budget in following years.  If a manager does not use all available 
funds there is the real possibility that the following year’s budget may be cut, it does not 
matter if the savings resulted from poor budgeting or from implementing a cost saving 
measure.  “Few could reject the observation that conventional budgeting with its primary 
focus on control promotes destructive budget-maximizing competition among agencies, 
                                                 
34 Teresa Curristine, “Government Performance: Lessons and Challenges,” OECD Journal On 
Budgeting (2005): 130-131. 
35 Office of Management and Budget, “OMB Circular N0. A-11,” OMB (2006), 210-3 – 220-2. 
36 Robert McNab and Francois Melese, “Implementing the GPRA: Examining the Prospects for 
Performance Budgeting in the Federal Government,” Public Budgeting & Finance (2003): 77. 
37 Ibid., 78. 
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and most importantly discourages cost-saving efforts.”38  Agencies that habitually 
overspend or ask for supplemental funds may be rewarded with an increasing amount of 
funds, while a carefully-managed agency may be penalized. 
A performance budget attempts to shift the focus from resource allocation to 
outcome or output generation and largely depends on agencies developing useful 
strategic plans, identifying goals that are meaningful and measurable, and providing 
enough motivation for an agency to effectively allocate resources and administer 
programs.39  McNab and Melese refer to these as goal congruence, measurement and 
incentives.  OMB defines a performance budget as “A performance budget is a 
presentation that clearly explains the relationship between performance goals and the 
costs for achieving targeted levels of performance.  In general, a performance budget 
links strategic goals with related long-term and annual performance goals and with the 
costs of specific activities that contribute to the achievement of those goals.”40  One 
desired outcome of performance budgeting would be the more efficient use of resources 
and improved levels of service.   
Federal agencies are now producing performance budgets and linking these 
budget items to measurable goals and also reporting on the ability of the agency to meet 
those goals.  Agency reports spanning the transition period from performance plans to 
performance budgets were examined during the course of this project. 
2. The U.S. Move toward Performance Budgets 
GPRA legislation requires federal agencies to develop five-year strategic plans, 
and to update those plans every three years.  Agencies are also required to produce annual 
performance plans with measurable objectives, and annual performance and 
accountability reports detailing the agencies’ success at meeting goals.  In 2005, OMB 
required all agencies to submit performance budgets in lieu of the performance plans 
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previously required.  The performance budgets provide a link between agency plans and 
objectives, with the funding needed to achieve those goals.  Goal congruence is a vital 
issue, however.  “Only when the agency, stakeholders, and clients have achieved 
consensus on a set of objectives can the agency develop metrics to gauge its performance 
over time relative to these objectives.”41   
This indicates that goal congruence may take some time if it can ever truly be 
achieved.  In order to obtain goal congruence the general public, federal agencies and 
politicians all need to agree about the priorities of an organizations objectives and what it 
should cost to achieve those objectives.  To take it further, in order for a performance-
based budget to be truly effective there would need to be an effort made to actually use 
the performance information in the budget process.   
3. The Program Assessment Rating Tool 
The Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) is also the result of government 
initiative to link performance with resources, and establishes the basis for establishing 
goals in organizational strategic plans.42  OMB developed the Program Assessment 
Rating Tool (PART) in 2002 as “a diagnostic tool used to assess the performance of 
Federal programs and to drive improvements in program performance […] designed to 
provide a consistent approach to assessing and rating programs across the Federal 
government.”43  
PART utilizes a questionnaire to evaluate agency effectiveness.  The 25-question 
survey is separated into four parts:  program purpose and design, strategic planning, 
program management, and program results/accountability.  The weighted value of each  
 
 
                                                 
41 Robert McNab and Francois Melese, “Implementing the GPRA: Examining the Prospects for 
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question contributes to the total questionnaire score, and a total agency score is then 
calculated.  The total agency score is converted by OMB into one of four qualitative 
ratings:  effective, moderately effective, adequate, and ineffective.44 
OMB evaluates agencies by comparing program goals with expected and 
achieved performance, and then offers improvement recommendations where 
performance falls short of goals. 
In the President’s Management Agenda (PMA), the administration established the 
integration of budget allocation and performance as one of the “five government-wide 
management priorities.”45  In testimony to Congress, David Walker, the Comptroller 
General of the United States, stated “The current administration has taken several steps to 
strengthen the integration of budget, cost, and performance information […] The budget 
and performance integration initiative includes elements such as the PART used to 
review programs, an emphasis on improving outcome measures, and improving 
monitoring of program performance.”46  Walker also states that the “PART is the central 
element in the performance budgeting piece of the PMA.”47 
Since its inception in 2003, the PART has been viewed as a tool to help improve 
government efficiency and effectiveness, and as a method to help legislators with 
resource allocation decisions.  It aims to hold agencies accountable to performance 
expectations, and it has drawn increased interest from government stakeholders.  The 
PART process includes a “consistent series of analytical questions, which allows 
programs to show improvements over time, and allows comparisons between similar 
programs.”48   
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47 Ibid. 
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A key drive behind the PART is the goal to link performance results with budget 
allocation.  According to the GAO, “OMB generally proposed budget increases for 
programs that received ratings of effective or moderately effective and decreased funding 
requests for those programs that were rated ineffective.”49  However, Congressional 
budget action has yet to mirror these OMB proposals. 
4. What Can We Learn from Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development Countries Experiences? 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is made 
up of 30 member countries sharing a commitment to democratic government and the free 
market economy.50  The United States has been an OECD member since 1961.  It is 
possible the U. S. could learn from mistakes made by other countries and gain from their 
successes as well.   
A few of the challenges encountered by OECD countries when introducing 
performance measures included difficulties in attributing outcomes to specific programs, 
difficulties in designing measures for specific activities, and insufficient political support 
for this kind of work.51 
Also, OECD countries realized it takes considerable time to implement a 
performance budget.  Many countries that have been using this approach for at least ten 
years indicate their biggest challenges are defining clear objectives and designing 
measures for specific activities.52 A review of performance plans and reports submitted 
by U.S. agencies may reveal a trend towards improving measures.  If other countries’ 
experiences are any indication, the U. S. may struggle for years with this aspect, possibly 
because the task of designing clear objectives and measures is an ongoing struggle that  
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has no clear endpoint.  When an agency’s leadership changes its focus on purpose and 
priorities, there may be a corresponding change in the objectives and measures of the 
agency.   
What about the incentive piece?  There is still a pervasive attitude within the U. S. 
government to spend all available funds or risk losing resources in future years.  This 
would indicate that the proper incentives are not in place to reward cost saving initiatives.  
“Very few countries appear to have formal mechanisms in place that relate the success or 
failure in achieving a target to the reward or punishment of individuals or agencies.”53  In 
many OECD countries no rewards or sanctions are applied if a target is met or not met.54   
One possible incentive is to allow agencies to keep a portion of their non-expended 
resources for discretionary activities.55  This could help create an atmosphere that does 
not punish agencies achieving savings 
While many countries have reached the stage of introducing performance targets 
into their budget documentation, fewer countries have integrated this information into 
their budgetary decision-making process and even less have used it in the allocation of 
resources.  “Forty one percent of OECD member countries reported that it was not 
common for politicians in the executive or the legislature to use performance measures in 
any decision making.  This includes countries that have long experience in this area, such 
as the United States.”56   
A disincentive for poorly performing agencies is used in some OECD countries 
where resources are held constant and the program is reviewed or maintained at a 
constant funding level conditional on future performance.57  Eliminating a business or 
portion of a business for poor performance is common in the corporate world but seems 
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to be a very harsh and not too common action in the United States federal government or 
in OECD countries.  Offering incentives to corporate executives for good performance is 
another common practice in the corporate world but this approach is not generally 
applied to heads of government agencies in the U.S.  This matches with OECD countries 
as performance measures are rarely or never used in determining the pay or rewards of 
heads of agencies with responsibility for overseeing programs.58  Offering agency heads 
bonuses for good performance may be one method to help promote cost saving practices.  
The clear establishment of goals and incentive levels would need to be very clearly 
defined with agreement of stakeholders in order to be effective.   
The objectives, framework, and implementation of GPRA and performance 
budgets follow closely with methods attempted in many OECD countries.  The fact that 
the U.S. used incremental implementation means that all following agencies have 
benefited from the lessons learned by the leading agencies that first implemented GPRA.   
As mentioned, some OECD countries have worked through the difficulty of 
setting realistic measures for over ten years.  The process of determining realistic 
measures may be iterative.  For example, after measures are evaluated and determined to 
be unrealistic, new measures are set and then evaluated, until a satisfactory set of 
measures is determined for each agency.  Additionally, agencies will transform and 
change guiding priorities and leadership, driving a corresponding evolution in measures 
and objectives.  This will most likely be an ongoing process based on many changing 
factors.     
E. METHODOLOGY 
Previous sections gave an overview of the numerous reforms that have addressed 
the goal of more efficient and effective federal agencies.  The constant flow of reform 
initiatives raises the question of whether current initiatives are accomplishing their goals.  
As mentioned, this project attempted to determine if “the performance and accountability 
reports required by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 and 
                                                 
58 Teresa Curristine, “Performance Information in the Budget Process: Results of the OECD 2005 
Questionnaire,” OECD Journal on Budgeting (2005) 110, 111. 
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submitted by agencies during the last five years revealed material improvements in 
program effectiveness and public accountability through reported results?”  To answer 
this question a method of analyzing federal agency performance reports from year to year 
had to be created and applied.   
Three federal agencies were chosen for analysis:  The Department of Interior 
(DOI), The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and The Department of Veterans 
Affairs (VA).  These agencies were chosen primarily by their position within the 
Mercatus Center’s performance and accountability ratings.  The Mercatus Center, as 
described earlier evaluates federal agencies on the transparency and accuracy of their 
GPRA-required reports.  An agency was chosen from the top third of the list, the middle 
third and the bottom third of the list.  An agency was chosen from the top third, the 
middle third and the bottom third of the list--VA was ranked second, EPA was ranked 













                                                 
59 Maurice McTigue, Henry Wray, Jerry Ellig, 8th Annual Performance Report Scorecard, Mercatus 




Table 1.   Performance and Accountability Report Scorecard for Fiscal Year 2006 
(From: 8th Annual Performance and Accountability Report Scorecard for 
Fiscal Year 2006 from Mercatus Center at George Mason University, April 
2007) 
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The project evaluated the operational effectiveness and accountability of three 
federal agencies through an analysis of their GPRA-required reports for the period of 
2002 through 2006.  The discussion of effectiveness and accountability will be based on 
definitions provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  On its website, 
OMB defines effectiveness as “agencies making programs work better every year.”60  
OMB stated “accountability is doing what you said you would do.”61 
Federal agencies follow the same reporting requirements, but vary in the format 
and presentation of data.  For continuity, an attempt was made to report the analysis of 
each agency’s data in a similar fashion.  Similar key report features such as costs and 
numbers of performance measures achieved were used to generate effectiveness measures 
that would have similar meaning for all three agencies.  Table 2 below shows the 
resulting standardized report (EPA’s Strategic Goal One performance matrix), and is used 
to explain the analysis spreadsheet and formulas in more detail in subsequent paragraphs. 
 
                                                 
60 Office of Management and Budget, Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. 




Table 2.   Sample Agency Performance Matrix (After: EPA FY 2006) 
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The data came directly from the federal agencies’ annual performance reports.  
Background information and descriptions of some of the major goals came from the 
agencies’ strategic plans and performance plans or budgets. 
The first six columns of the spreadsheet were taken from the subject agencies’ 
annual reports.  The first column lists the strategic goal for the agency being evaluated.  
Each strategic goal can have varied number of objectives, and each objective has related 
performance measures with defined targets.  These targets indicate whether a 
performance measure was met or not.  Agencies vary greatly in the number of 
performance measures they utilize.  It was not beneficial to the analysis to list every 
performance measure, but the number of performance measures was relevant.  These 
numbers are shown in column 3.  Column 2 indicates the cost by objective and the total 
cost associated with the goal being shown, in this case goal 1.  Columns 4, 5 and 6 
indicate the number of performance measures that were either met, not met, or either not 
reported or data was unavailable.   
The remainder of the spreadsheet was developed to analyze the data in the first six 
columns.  Comparable data for any agency could be entered into this spreadsheet for 
similar analysis, so this tool may prove useful for future related research. 
The difficulty in performing such analysis is that not every goal or performance 
measure stays the same year to year.  For instance, EPA shifted from ten goals in 2002 to 
five goals in 2003.  Not every performance measure stayed the same either.  Some goals 
had an increase or decrease in performance measures from year to year.   
Agencies often change performance targets year to year, making the targets more 
or less difficult to achieve.  This variability often makes it difficult to conduct a 
meaningful analysis year to year.  Also, data indicating performance measure 
achievement may not be available for one or more years.  The analysis did not attempt to 
retroactively update performance measures once data became available in future agency 
reports; only data available for the goal in the actual year’s report was used for analysis.  
For example, a 2004 performance measure showing data not available until 2006 was not 
updated in the 2004 spreadsheet after it was determined the goal was met in the 2006 
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report.  The guiding logic is that data for some 2005 and 2006 measures may not be 
available now; if 2002-2004 data was updated it would skew the data for years 2005 and 
2006.  If goals do not change drastically year to year, there should theoretically be a 
similar number of goals with data lags from year to year.  Meaningful information can be 
gleaned from analyzing the goals that were met within the subject year.  That being said, 
a program activity with many performance measures with unavailable data may appear to 
be an underperforming activity.  In fact, it may just be lacking data.  All available data 
were used in the calculations of the various rates and measures of for the analysis.  An 
explanation of the devised formulas will prove useful. 
The percentage of goals exceeded or met is simply the number of performance 
measures that met targets divided by the total number of performance measures for that 
objective.   
 
# of performance measures met% of performance measures met = 
total # performance measures in objective
 
Figure 1.   Percentage of Goal Exceeded or Met Formula 
The Weighted Performance Rating (WPR) is equal to the percentage of goals met 
multiplied by the cost for the objective, divided by the total goal cost (Figure 2).  It is a 
percentage of total goal costs applied to the achieved performance measures.  The WPR 
takes into account the cost as spread across all of an objectives performance measures. 
For an example of WPR, strategic goal 1 objective 1 of table 1 has a cost of 
$547(M) and has eight performance measures, only one of which was met.  The 
percentage of goals met would be 13 percent (one divided by eight), and the WPR would 
be 7.45 percent (percentage of goals met multiplied by the cost for objective 1, divided 
by the entire goal 1 cost).  This shows that EPA met 13 percent of this objective’s 
performance measures, but the achieved measure accounts for only 7.45 percent of the 
total goal 1 costs.  Implicit in this measure, the larger the percentage, the more effectively 
the resources are being used to meet performance objectives.  Conversely, a lower 
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percentage indicates less effective use of resources in meeting performance objectives.  
The WPR is also useful when looking at the relative importance of objectives.  For 
example, an objective that consistently achieves 100 percent of its performance measures 
but only has a 3 percent WPR would not be accomplishing as much as an objective that 
meets only 50 percent of its performance measures, but has a WPR of 10 percent. 
 
objective costWPR = % performance measures met  
total goal cost
⎛ ⎞× ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Figure 2.   Weighted Performance Rating Formula 
The Budget Effectiveness Rate (BER) is simply the percentage of goals met 
within one objective multiplied by the cost for that particular objective (Figure 3).  The 
total for this column is the relative amount of costs that went towards performance 
measures that were met.  
 
BER = objective cost  % performance measures met×  
Figure 3.   Budget Effectiveness Rate Formula 
The Goal Consistency Delta (GCD) is the net change in goals, added or 
subtracted, since the previous year.  This allows the reader to get a feel for how often an 
agency changes its goals and what the trend is with these changes. 
The Goal Consistency Rating (GCR) is a percentage, which relates an increase or 
decrease in performance measures versus cost (Figure 4).  For example, if a goal 
increased by one performance measure but the cost remained the same, the GCR would 
be greater than 100 percent, a possible indication of doing more with less.  If a goal 




less than 100 percent, a possible indication of doing less at greater cost.  This is used to 
put some weight to the addition and subtraction of performance measures from year to 
year. 
 
total budget amt current yr number perf measures current yrGCR = 1- -
total budget amt previous yr number perf measures previous yr
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  
Figure 4.   Goal Consistency Rating Formula 
The Goal Performance Efficiency Rating (GPER) is a combination of the 
percentage of performance measures exceeded or met, the WPR and the GCR.  It is 
expressed as a number (Figure 5).  The meaning of the GPER is applicable to the specific 
goal being analyzed within each agency.  Comparison between agencies, or even between 
goals, would not be meaningful.  An increasing GPER indicates increasing performance; 
a decreasing GPER indicates decreasing performance. 
 
GPER = total # performance measures met WPR(total) GCR 100× × ×  
Figure 5.   Goal Performance Efficiency Rating Formula 
F.   ASSUMPTIONS AND POTENTIAL SHORTCOMINGS 
Before discussing the trends revealed in the agencies by these measures, it must 
be emphasized that it was not the intent of this project to determine why the performance 
of each agency improved or declined.  The project aimed to simply determine if the 
agency’s performance and accountability reports indicated evidence of material 
performance improvement.  In the reports the organizations describe management 
challenges that provide perspective on department performance during the evaluation 
period.  These discussions offer insight to why the department may have had difficulty in 
meeting a certain performance target or improving the effectiveness of its operations.  For 
example, in 2003, VA mentioned that it was unable to absorb the dramatic increase in 
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demand on its health care system as the number of veterans accessing the system rose 
from 2.9 million in 1995 to five million in 2003.62  The reader should examine the 
agencies’ performance and accountability reports for additional information. 
The project’s methodology and tools have potential shortcomings and limits.  
First, our method of determining whether a department was successfully performing may 
have overlooked positive strides in performance improvement.  The analysis examined 
the performance and accountability reports to determine if, through each agency’s 
reporting, the agency achieved its performance target for specific activities under the 
various goals and objectives.  The determination was made whether or not a specific 
target was successfully achieved.  This determination was used as a factor in the GPER 
rate and the BER rate in the performance matrix, both of which were vital to the overall 
analysis of performance.  No weight or partial credit was given in the formulas to the 
organizations for perceived performance improvement that fell short of targeted goals.  
In many instances, the performance and accountability reports discuss progress 
toward achieving targets for activities that both fell short of targets and surpassed targets.  
Because our basis for the specific tool was either ‘met or not met,’ these instances of 
perceived performance improvement were not considered in the calculation of that 
performance metric.   
Also, readers should be cautioned that the agencies’ perception of performance 
improvement differs from this project’s determination of performance improvement.  It is 
understood that each department considers performance improvement to be an increase in 
the simple success rate or ratio of its established output or outcome targets.  This project, 
however, determined performance improvement on the cumulative basis of its six 
performance analysis tools, not on a single stand-alone rate or ratio. 
An assumption was also made about the relative importance of each goal as it 
related to the department’s overall mission.  It was assumed that in a resource-constrained 
environment, government agencies would distribute resources in a manner that would  
 
                                                 
62 Department of Veterans Affairs, FY 2002 Performance and Accountability Report, January 2003, 5. 
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meet the most critical needs of the agencies.  In other words, more resources would be 
devoted to the areas, activities, and objectives that were most important to the individual 
agency’s mission.   
This project did not attempt to determine what goal or objective was most 
important to each agency’s mission.  Each agency is expected to know, understand and 
work toward the most pressing needs of its constituents and beneficiaries.  The WPR and 
BER analysis tools serve as measures of perceived objective importance for the analysis, 
as each calculates a factor based on the size of a goal’s budget and its target achievement.  
The tools attempt to show how effective the agencies were at applying valuable resources 
to the most critical goals and objectives.   
The analysis employs at least three terms when referring to the amount of money 
each agency used to conduct its business:  costs, budget, and obligations.  The words 
correlate to the terminology in the agencies’ reports, and it is assumed that they refer to 
what it cost the agency to carry out its mission for each program activity.  Though each of 
the terms have distinct definitions in the practice of governmental financial management, 
this project did not attempt to determine, for example, if a given cost was actually 
expended from the Treasury, if a budgeted amount was originally allotted or came via a 
supplemental source, or whether any of the obligations were still outstanding.  The reader 
should consider those terms to be interchangeable, and understand that they represent the 
resources applied toward achieving the specific goals and objectives of each department, 
as discussed in the analysis of each organization. 
Additionally, our analysis did not attempt to determine why the agencies 
experienced increases or declines in their respective budgets year to year.  A focused 
analysis of the influence of performance-based budgeting, administration priorities, or the 
impact of current events during related fiscal years would be more appropriate to 
determine rationale for budget fluctuations. 
Each of the agencies required billions of dollars in resources to conduct its 
mission.  An analysis of the trends in the performance measures will be made to 
determine if those resources were used effectively, and primarily to determine if the 
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agencies’ performance and accountability reports indicate material improvements in 
program effectiveness.  The Department of the Interior’s analysis will be discussed, 
followed by an evaluation of the Environmental Protection Agency.  Finally, the analysis 
and results for the Department of Veterans Affairs will be presented. 
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II. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR ORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Interior’s (DOI), commonly referred to as the “Department of 
Everything Else” defines its mission as to protect and provide access to our nation’s 
natural and cultural heritage and honor our trust responsibilities to Indian Tribes and our 
commitments to island communities.63  The agency is ranked 18 of 24 in the latest 2006 
Mercatus Center at George Mason University Performance Scorecard (see Table 1).64  
Established on March 3, 1849, the department has seen its mission change 
dramatically over the past 150 years.  Although its original responsibilities generally 
included the construction of Washington D.C. water system, colonization of free Haitian 
slaves, exploration of the west, oversight of the District of Columbia jail system, 
management of hospitals and universities, and many more eclectic duties, today’s DOI 
prides itself as the U.S. principle Federal conservation agency.65  
In order to fulfill its mission, the DOI has a workforce of approximately 73,000 
employees, including the nearly 200,000 volunteers. Together they accomplish the 
following tasks, which routinely go unnoticed by the typical citizen: 
• Manage the protection and enjoyment of many of the nation’s special 
natural, cultural, and historic places 
• Conserve habitats, species, lands, and waters 
• Fulfill U.S. trust responsibilities to native Americans and island 
communities 
• Supply water and hydropower to the western U.S. 
• Provide responsible access to much of the nation’s energy resources 
                                                 
63 United States, Dept. of the Interior and others, Fiscal Year 2006: Annual Report on Performance 
and Accountability: November 15, 2006 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 2006), 322, 
http://www.doi.gov/pfm/par/par2006/, (accessed September 12, 2007). 
64 Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Annual Performance Report Scorecard, 
http://www.mercatus.org/programs/pageID.350,programID.4/default.asp, (accessed October 29, 2007). 
65 Ibid., 5. 
 34
• Provide scientific data need to enhance understanding of the natural world 
• Inform decisions related to natural resource conservation and sustainable 
development 
• Inform decisions related to disaster preparedness and response 
To further understand the magnitude of DOI’s impact on our nation, the following 
is a list “by the numbers” detail of exactly how much stewardship they have:66  
• Land 
• 504M acres of surface land; 55.7M of which belong to American 
Indians and Alaska Natives 
• 700M acres of mineral estate underlying Federal and other land 
managed by DOI through leasing 
• Water 
• 1.76B acres of Outer Continental Shelf 
• 348 Reservoirs 
• 2500 Dams 
• 58 Hydroelectric Power Plants 
 
• Recreation Opportunities 
• 388 units in the National Park System 
• 545 units in the National Wildlife Refuge System 
• 291 DOI managed Wilderness Areas 
• 88 National Monuments 
• 45 National Natural Landmarks 
• 441 miles of BLM National Recreation Trails 
• Wildlife 
• 86 National Fish Hatcheries 
• 206 Wild Horse and Burro Herd Management Aras 
• 1264 U.S. Endangered Species 
                                                 
66 United States, Dept. of the Interior and others, Fiscal Year 2004: Annual Report on Performance 
and Accountability: November 15, 2004 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 2004), 350, 
http://www.doi.gov/pfm/par2004/, (accessed September 12, 2007). 
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A few significant dates in history that helped to transform DOI into the agency of 
today:67  
• 1850-1857……….Interior's Mexican Boundary Commission establishes 
the international boundary with Mexico 
• 1872……………..Congress establishes Yellowstone as the first National 
Park.  
• 1879……………..Creation of the U.S. Geological Survey 
• 1887-1889……….The Interstate Commerce Commission is established in 
Interior 
• 1902……………..The Bureau of Reclamation is established to construct 
dams and aqueducts in the west 
• 1903……………..President Theodore Roosevelt establishes the first 
National Wildlife Refuge at Pelican Island, Florida 
• 1930……………..The Bureau of Pensions is transferred to the Veterans 
Administration 
• 1916……………..President Wilson signed legislation creating The 
National Park Service 
• 1940……………..The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is created from the 
Bureau of Fisheries and the Bureau of Biological Survey 
• 1950-1951……….Interior assumes jurisdiction over Guam, American 
Samoa, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
• 1980……………..The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act is 
enacted adding 47M acres to the National Park System and 54M acres to 
the National Wildlife Refuge System 
• 2001……………..Gale A. Norton is nominated the first woman to serve 
as Secretary of the Interior 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
DOI is functionally structured into eight discrete bureaus that as a whole have the 
responsibility for accomplishing DOI’s overall mission.  These bureaus include 1) Bureau 
of Reclamation (BOR), 2) Minerals Management service (MMS), 3) Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA), 4) U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 5) Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), 
                                                 
67 United States, Dept. of the Interior and others, Fiscal Year 2004: Annual Report on Performance 
and Accountability: November 15, 2004 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 2004), 350, 
http://www.doi.gov/pfm/par2004/, (accessed September 12, 2007). 
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6) National Park Service (NPS), 7) Bureau of Land Management (BLM), 8) Office of 
Surface Mining (OSM).  See Figure 6 for an individual mission description for each 
bureau.68 
In addition to the bureaus, DOI has established departmental offices that support 
critical operations and help the bureaus carryout their mission.  They include the Offices 
of the Special Trustee for American Indians (OST), Insular Affairs (OIA), Inspector 
General (OIG), Law Enforcement and Security (OLES) and Wildland Fire Coordination 
(OWFC). 
                                                 
68 United States, Dept. of the Interior and others, Fiscal Year 2004: Annual Report on Performance 
and Accountability: November 15, 2004 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 2004), 322, 
http://www.doi.gov/pfm/par2004/, (accessed September 12, 2007). 
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Figure 6.   DOI Bureaus and Missions 
Bureau of Reclamation 
Manage, develop, and protect water 
and related resources in an 
environmentally and economically 
sound manner in the interest of the 
American public. 
Minerals Management Service 
The Minerals Management 
Service manages the mineral 
resources on the 
Outer Continental Shelf and 
Federal and Indian mineral 
revenues to enhance 
public and trust benefit, 
promote responsible use and 
realize fair value. 
Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Fulfill its trust responsibilities and 
promote self-determination on behalf 
of Tribal governments, American 
Indians, and Alaska Natives. 
U.S. Geological Survey 
Provide the Nation with reliable, 
unbiased information to describe and 
understand the earth; minimize loss of 
life and property from natural 
disasters; manage water, biological, 
energy and mineral resources; and 
enhance and protect our quality of life. 
Fish and Wildlife Service 
Working with others to conserve, 
protect, and enhance fish, wildlife and 
plants, and their habitats for the 
continuing benefit of the American 
people. 
National Park Service 
Preserve unimpaired the natural and 
cultural resources and values of the 
national park system for the enjoyment, 
education, and inspiration of this 
and future generations. The National Park 
Service cooperates with partners 
to extend the benefits of natural and 
cultural resource conservation and 
outdoor recreation throughout this country 
and the world. 
Bureau of Land Management 
To sustain the health, 
diversity, and productivity 
of the public lands for the 
use and enjoyment of 
present and future 
generations. 
Office of Surface Mining 
Ensure that coal mines are operated in 
a manner that protects citizens and 
the environment during mining and 
assures that the land is restored to 
beneficial use following mining, and 
mitigate the effects of past mining by 
aggressively pursuing reclamation of 
abandoned coal mine lands. 
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C. ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS 
The DOI 2003-2008 Strategic Plan deviated from the norm of what purpose a 
typical government long-term plan was to serve.  DOI sought to move beyond the 
traditional theoretical framework of previous strategic plans to develop a plan that could 
produce measurable results where it counts, in the field.  Previous plans served the 
organization well in establishing what actions were needed to complete stated goals; 




Figure 7.   DOI Mission, Vision, & Key Business Principles 
To round-off its Strategic Plan, the DOI wanted to include existing visions of 
program performance known as the “Four C’s”—[Consultation, Cooperation, 
Communication, and Conservation] and its four key business principles of Value, 
                                                 
69 United States, Dept. of the Interior, U.S. Department of the Interior Strategic Plan Fiscal Year 
2003-2008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of Planning and Performance 
Management, 2003), http://www.doi.gov/ppp/strat%5Fplan%5Ffy2003%5F2008.pdf, (accessed September 
12, 2007). 
MISSION 
The U.S. Department of the Interior protects and manages the 
Nation’s natural resources and cultural heritage; provides scientific 
and other information about those resources; and honors its trust 
responsibilities or special commitments to American Indians, Alaskan 
Natives, and affiliated Island Communities. 
 
VISION 
Consultation, cooperation, and communication all in the service of 
conservation. 
 






Accountability, Modernization, and Integration that are applied across all functions.  
Using these ingredients along with the Presidents Management Agenda, DOI had a 
prescription for sound management decision and direction. 
The DOI intended the new plant to encompass the full range of the Department’s 
mission, programs, & organizations, but most importantly, it wanted the plan to focus on 
results rather than inputs.  In addition to the ingredients mentioned above, they 
segregated the Department into four broad areas of mission responsibility where each 
area has its own strategic goal and applicable end outcome goals—Resource Protection, 
Resource Use, Recreation, Serving Communities (see Figure 1-2).  Each end outcome 
goal is accompanied by a performance measure used to gauge successes and 
effectiveness.  These end outcome goals also have accompanying intermediate strategic 
goals that are also measured.  These two categories of goals and measures drive the 
organization to achieve its overall mission.  Likewise, it is the achievement of these goals 
that we intend to analyze through basic effective and efficiency ratings.70    
                                                 
70 United States, Dept. of the Interior, U.S. Department of the Interior Strategic Plan Fiscal Year 
2003-2008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of Planning and Performance 
Management, 2003), http://www.doi.gov/ppp/strat%5Fplan%5Ffy2003%5F2008.pdf, (accessed September 
12, 2007). 
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III. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In our analysis of performance for the five year period 2002-2006, certain 
qualifies must be addressed to better understand agency baselines.  DOI made significant 
changes to their performance measures in their 2003-2008 Strategic Plan, requiring a 
baseline adjustment from 2003 (under previous strategic plan) to 2004.  These changes 
turned the focus away from the tangible, yet often unrelated input measures, to output 
measures that concentrated the focus on results.71 
To adjust for the change in baseline measures, the analysis is divided into two 
distinct performance periods; the first encompassing the old performance measures 
(Strategic Goals) from 2002-2003 and the second looking at performance through the 
new results focused measurements (Mission Areas) from 2004-2006.  Also, two 
important measures of goal consistency, the Goal Consistency Delta (GCD) and Goal 
Consistency Rating (GCR), can only be applied to the years following a re-baseline year.  
In this analysis, you will only see these specific performance measures applied to 2003, 
2005, and 2006.  
The analysis will focus on each strategic goal and mission area across its 
applicable two or three-year period with an objective of identifying positive, negative, or 
neutral trends and highlighting outliers that may have affected performance.  DOI’s total 
budget authority request for FY 2006 was $13.780B.  A $914M plus-up over the previous 
year.  
                                                 
71 United States, Dept. of the Interior, U.S. Department of the Interior Strategic Plan Fiscal Year 
2003-2008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of Planning and Performance 
Management, 2003), http://www.doi.gov/ppp/strat%5Fplan%5Ffy2003%5F2008.pdf, (accessed September 
12, 2007). 
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A. PERFORMANCE YEARS 2002-2003 
1. Strategic Goal 1 (SG-1) – Protect the Environment and Preserve Our 
Nation’s Natural and Cultural Resources 
a. Performance Year 2002 
For 2002, DOI accomplished (met or exceeded) 57.4 percent (74) of their 
128 performance measures embedded within eleven Program Activity Goals.  With a 
total budgeted amount of $4.170B, DOI displayed stronger performance in many of its 
more expensive program activities.  Because of its success in the more heavily funded 
activities, it rated an overall WPR of 62.86 percent. 
Four program areas saw less than average performance.  The first was in 
‘Understanding the Condition of Public Lands’, which it accomplished only 16.7 percent 
(1 out of 6) of its performance measures and the second was ‘Strengthen and Preserve 
Natural and Cultural Resources’, which noted only a 25 percent (2 out of 8) goal 
accomplishment.  ‘Environmental Restoration’ and ‘Environmental Protection’ saw a 
zero percent achievement in their combined four performance measures. 
Overall, SG-1 for 2002 produced a subpar Goal Performance Efficiency 
Rating (GPER - a three-factor product of the Percentage of Goals Exceeded or Met, 
WPR, and GCR) of 24.1 percent.  Note that a GCR factor could not be incorporated into 
the 2002 GPER scores, effectively providing a default GCR score of 100 percent. 
b. Performance Year 2003 
In 2003, the picture improved on slightly in terms of raw goal 
accomplishment as they achieved 65.6 percent of 128 Performance Measures; improving 
8.2 percent over 2002.  WPR had a marginal increase to 68.8 percent.  They continued to 
show strong achievement in the most heavily funded areas such as ‘Habitat Conservation-
A Network of Lands and Waters’, which carried $1.346B of the total budget. 
 
 43
A significant improvement was made in ‘Understanding the Condition of 
Public Lands’ where they achieved 44.4 percent of the goals.  However, a decrease of 
12.5 percent was seen in ‘Strengthen and Preserve Natural and Cultural Resources’.  As 
in 2002, ‘Environmental Restoration’ and ‘Environmental Protection’ failed to achieve 
any of their four goals. 
Goal consistency for 2003 was good with an overall Goal Consistency 
Delta (GCD) of -1, which was a result of decreasing their performance measure total to 
128.  Their Goal Consistency Rating (GCR), a measure of goal’s total change in budget 
to its total change in performance measures, was very good with a rating of 91.6 percent. 
Overall, SG-1 produced a GPER score of 41.3; second highest of the six 
strategic goals for 2002-2003.  The rating suffered slightly from its mediocre 
performance in meeting performance measures.  On a positive note, this strategic goal 
produced an approximately $400M increase in the Budget Effectiveness Rate (BER). 
2. Strategic Goal 2 (SG-2) – Provide Recreation for America 
a. Performance Year 2002 
DOI accomplished only 45.5 percent (15) of their stated 33 performance 
measures for this goal.  This goal contained seven program activities with a total budget 
amount of $2.116B.  The WPR for this goal, 53 percent, registered higher than the raw 
accomplishment percentage because the agency achieved higher goal accomplishment in 
two distinct activates—‘Provide for Public Enjoyment and Visitor Experience of Parks’ 
and ‘Enhance Recreational Opportunities Managed by Others’.   
Two areas registering below average achievement were ‘Ensure 
Organizational Effectiveness’, which failed to complete any of its five performance 
measures and ‘Greater Public Use on Service (FWS) Lands’, which completed only 33.3 
percent of its three measures. 
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b. Performance Year 2003 
This year saw a substantial increase in performance measure 
accomplishment over last year; registering an overall raw accomplishment score of 87.5 
percent (28) of the 32 performance measures in SG-2.  This was a 42 percent 
improvement over last year reported rate.  While the WPR was also high with an 82.2 
percent score, it indicates for the first time a shifting of better performance in the higher 
funded areas to those with less funding. 
Four of the seven program activities achieved an outstanding 100 percent 
accomplishment with only the ‘Land Management and Development’ activity lagging 
behind at 67 percent.  The GCD was strong with a -1 delta due to a decrease in number of 
performance measures to 32.  Their goal consistency along with a minimal change in 
total budget for this goal led to a strong GCR of 95.7 percent. 
Overall, SG-2 registered a very strong GPER score of 68; the strongest 
score seen in 2002 and 2003.  This high score was a result of strong goal accomplishment 
and steady goal consistency.  SG-2 also yielded a positive BER increase of $660M, 
indicating more efficient use of agency funding. 
3. Strategic Goal 3 (SG-3) – Manage Resources for a Healthy 
Environment and a Strong Economy 
a. Performance Year 2002 
SG-3 contains 11 Program Activity Goals with a total allocated budget of 
$4.363B.  The agency accomplished 48.1 percent (26) of its 54 goals and scored a 
similarly pedestrian WPR of 42.6 percent.  One of the activity goals, ‘Operate and 
Maintain Facilities Safely, Reliably, and Efficiently to Provide Project Benefits’, was 




DOI failed to meet any of the performance measures in six of the eleven 
SG-3 Program Activity Goals, which totaled $1.547B of the $4.363B total activity 
budget.  This failure was the primary catalyst that resulted in low accomplishment scores 
for SG-3.  The low performance measure accomplishment rate also contributed to a low 
GPER rating of 20.5. 
b. Performance Year 2003 
This year saw an approximately 20 percent improvement in goal 
performance reporting 60 percent (27) of the 45 goals met or exceeded.  Four of the 
program activities achieved 100 percent performance measure completion.  DOI achieved 
a marked improvement in its WPR by rating a score of 62.3 percent.  A sign that the 
agency focused performance accomplishment on its heavier funded activities.   
Only one program activity continued a zero performance achievement 
from 2002 - ‘Continental Shelf Mineral Development’ that has an allocated budget of 
$33M.  The GCD result was a -9, but it did not adversely affect the GCR to the full extent 
expected due to a proportional $538M decrease in allocated funding to SG-3.  The GCR 
calculation came in at 95.7 percent. 
Overall, SG-3 made marked improvement in every measured area of 
performance yielding an improved 35.8 GPER score.  It also showed greater efficiency in 
budget execution producing a BER increase of over $500M. 
4. Strategic Goal 4 (SG-4) – Manage for Excellence and Accountability 
a. Performance Year 2002 
Although SG-4 contains only three program activities, it has an allocated 
budget amount of $1.515B—fourth largest of the six strategic goals.  It met or exceeded 
68.8 percent (11) of its 16 performance measures.  SG-4 also achieved similar 
performance in the WPR scoring 68 percent, which indicates an almost perfect balance of 
effort in accomplishing subscribed goals.  Consistent with goal completion, SG-4 
achieved a BER of $1.030B. 
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One program activity, ‘Improve Land, Resources, and Title Information’, 
achieved less than average performance.  Accomplishing only two of the four 
performance measures, it earned a goal performance rating of 50 percent.  Overall, SG-4 
earned an above average GPER score of 46.7 for 2002. 
b. Performance Year 2003 
SG-4 saw a slight decrease in goal performance with 56.3 percent (9) 
completion of its 16 performance measures.  Performance in the ‘Improve Land, 
Resources, and Title Information’ program activity fell by half to 25 percent.  This 
contributed significantly to the overall performance decrease. 
The GCD rating was zero indicting the agency remained consistent in their 
stated goals.  There were no changes in any of the three program activities.  As a result of 
a small increase in the total budget and no change in the number of performance 
measures, SG-4’s GCR score was 98.1 percent 
Overall SG-4 yielded a 35.2 GPER score; an 11.5 point decrease over the 
previous year that is primarily due to a falloff in meeting performance measures.  The 
goals BER also decreased $44M over the two-year period, indicating an overall decrease 
in budget utilization. 
5. Strategic Goal 5 (SG-5) – Meet Our Trust Responsibilities to Indian 
Tribes and our Commitments to Island Communities 
a. Performance Year 2002 
The goals met or exceeded percentage for SG-5 was a sub-par at 53.8 
percent; accomplishing only 35 of its 65 stated performance measures.  Two program 
activities with a combined budget of $101M, ‘Admin and Support Services’ and 
‘Overview’, reported zero percent of goals met.  Conversely, SG-5 had four strong 
activity groups reporting 100 percent goal accomplishment.  This balance of strong and 
weak activity performance led to the average scores. 
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SG-5 successfully utilized $1.376B of the total $2.744B in allocated 
budget.  Its WPR score was slightly below the raw performance attaining a 50.1 percent 
rating.  Overall, the GPER rating was the second lowest, registering at 27.  This is strictly 
the product of lower than average WPR and raw completion percentages. 
b. Performance Year 2003 
Strategic Goal 5 faired considerably worse in 2003 than in the previous 
year.  While its overall raw goal accomplishment was slightly (2 percent) better than 
2002’s record, it suffered a dramatic decrease in the WPR rating due to a shift of 
efficiencies in goal accomplishment.  Performance measures with less budget allocations 
saw an increase in accomplishment, while larger budgeted measures saw a balancing 
decrease in performance.  More focus was placed less significant goals, some with zero 
budgeted dollars allocated, than those with significant allocations.  For example, four of 
the activities with a 100 percent completion rate had no allocations.  
The GCD for SG-5 summed to a delta of -5.  Combine this delta with just 
over a $100M decrease in budget from 2002 to 2003 and you get a GCR that measured in 
solidly at 96.4 percent.  Overall, the agency registered a GPER of 16.3 for 2003 
compared with a 27 from 2002.  The extremely low WPR for 2003 was the cause of this 
decline; calling into question the agency’s prioritization of goal accomplishment. 
6. Strategic Goal 6 (SG-6) – Manage for Excellence and Accountability 
a. Performance Year 2002 
This strategic goal ended 2002 with a raw goal accomplishment of 55.6 
percent, which was identical to the goal’s WPR score; an indication of how accurate the 
agency was in directing its resources to maximize efficiency.  The total allocated budget 
was $1.882B and its budget effectiveness was $1.046B. 
SG-6 had only one ineffective program activity, ‘Ensure NPS 
Organizational Effectiveness’ that registered a goal completion rate of just 26.3 percent.  
Other program activities saw a broader distribution of results in almost every percentile—
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50 percent to 90 percent.  Its strongest program was ‘Ensure Financial and Managerial 
Accountability’ with a 90 percent completion rate.  Overall, SG-6’s goal performance 
efficiency registered in at 30.9.  
b. Performance Year 2003 
Performance improved significantly over 2002.  Raw goal completion 
topped 70 percentile.  The biggest increases came in two major program activities: 
‘Ensure NPS Organizational Effectiveness’ and ‘Better Manage Resources and Serve the 
Public’.  Coincidently, the WPR for 2003, like 2002, was exactly the same as the goal 
accomplishment rate. 
The budget increased by $1.214B to $3.096B and the GCD summed to -7.  
The increase in budget and decrease in performance measures acted together to decrease 
the GCR to a recorded low 22.6 percent.  Overall, SG-6 turned out a disappointing 11.1 
GPER primarily because of its low GCR.  To reiterate, an agency’s consistency and effort 




Table 3.   DOI FY 2002 Strategic Goal 1 Performance Matrix 
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Table 4.   DOI FY 2002 Strategic Goal 2 Performance Matrix 
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Table 5.   DOI FY 2002 Strategic Goal 3 Performance Matrix 
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Table 6.   DOI FY 2002 Strategic Goal 4 Performance Matrix 
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Table 7.   DOI FY 2002 Strategic Goal 5 Performance Matrix 
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Table 8.   DOI FY 2002 Strategic Goal 6 Performance Matrix 
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Table 9.   DOI FY 2003 Strategic Goal 1 Performance Matrix 
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Table 10.   DOI FY 2003 Strategic Goal 2 Performance Matrix 
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Table 11.   DOI FY 2003 Strategic Goal 3 Performance Matrix 
 58
 







Table 13.   DOI FY 2003 Strategic Goal 5 Performance Matrix 
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Table 14.   DOI FY 2003 Strategic Goal 6 Performance Matrix 
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B. PERFORMANCE YEARS 2004-2006 
When DOI switched from input based to end outcome measurements, a decrease 
in the total number for performance measures for each mission area (previously identified 
as strategic goals) occurred.  The average strategic goal contained approximately 58 
measures whereas the newly designated mission areas have an average of 44 measures.   
DOI also re-designated identifiable budget allocation to higher, more consolidated 
levels.  This change could be seen as significant; reducing to an immeasurable degree, the 
amount of transparency previously read into all levels of program activity.  To quantify 
the change, the agency went from the previously measurable program activity goals, 53 
in total where budget execution was measured and tracked, to as few as 16 end outcome 
goals embedded among the four mission areas.      
1. Mission Area 1 (MA-1) – Resource Protection-Protect the Nation’s 
Natural, Cultural, and Heritage Resources 
a. Performance Year 2004 
MA-1 had only three stated end outcome goals with a total of 48 
performance measures.  DOI’s total allocated budget for these goals was $3.047B.  Their 
performance in goal accomplishment was a dismal 52.1 percent (25) with each of the 
three scoring about the same; this translated into a BER of just $1.597B.  The WPR 
paralleled goal accomplishment weighing in at 52.4 percent. 
GCD and GCR are not measurable in this year as it constitutes a baseline 
for goal transformation.  Overall, MA-1 received a GPER score of 27.3; for this year a 
product of only the raw performance and WPR. 
b. Performance Year 2005 
This year saw a performance boost over last of nearly 23 percent to 75 
percent as DOI accomplished 36 of this area’s 48 goals.  As a result of this performance 
improvement, the BER increased to $2.837B.  WPR also improved, slightly exceeding 
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the raw performance by 1.1 percent; indicating that the agency’s solid performance in the 
heavier funded goals exceeded that of lesser funded goals. 
The goal consistency delta was good measuring in at zero; no increases or 
decreases were evident in any goal.  The budget allocation increased almost $700M over 
2004; this result combined with the zero GCD produced a GCR of 77.7 percent.  An 
increase in the number of goals would have improved this measure.  Overall, the GPER 
almost doubled to 44.3; a material improvement. 
c. Performance Year 2006 
Performance improved slightly over 2005, increasing a few percentage 
points to 79.2 percent.  The WPR was almost identical to the raw performance number 
indicating management was properly focused on priority funded goals.  This performance 
increase along with a budget plus-up helped to propel a BER increase of over $300M. 
Weak performance was evident in ‘Energy-Manage or Influence Resource 
Use to Enhance Public Benefit, Promote Responsible Use, and Ensure Optimal Value’ 
and ‘Forage-Manage or Influence Resource Use to Enhance Public Benefit, Promote 
Responsible Use, and Ensure Optimal Value’; they accomplished 64 percent and 67 
percent respectively. 
Goal consistency continued to look good with a zero delta.  The GCR, 
94.1 percent, saw a much better improvement due the increase in budget and consistency 
in goals.  Overall for the year, the GPER showed improvement increasing to 59.2.  An 







Mission Area 1 (MA-1) Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Goal Met N/A N/A 52.1% 75.0% 79.2% 
WPR N/A N/A 52.4% 76.1% 79.4% 
BER N/A N/A $1.597B $2.837B $3.136B 
GCR N/A N/A N/A 77.7% 94.1% 
GPER N/A N/A 27.3 44.3 59.2 
Table 15.   DOI Mission Area 1 Performance Summary 























Figure 8.   DOI Mission Area 1 Performance Graph 
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2. Mission Area 2 (MA-2) – Resource Use-Manage Resources to Promote 
Responsible Use and Sustain a Dynamic Economy 
a. Performance Year 2004 
MA-2 rated satisfactory goal accomplishment achieving 70.7 percent; 
rating a BER of $2.649B for a total budget of $3.530B.  This mission area tuned out an 
even better WPR rating 75 percent, which indicates stronger performance in goals with 
heavier funding.   
Two end outcome goals severely underperformed the average, ‘Forage-
Manage or Influence Resource Use to Enhance Public Benefit, Promote Responsible Use, 
and Ensure Optimal Value’ and ‘Forest Products-Manage or Influence Resource Use to 
Enhance Public Benefit, Promote Responsible Use, and Ensure Optimal Value’.  They 
scored 33.3 percent and 25 percent respectively.  MA-2 rated a GPER score of 53.1 
which is the top rating among the four mission areas. 
b. Performance Year 2005 
MA-2 experienced goal achievement at a slightly higher rate over 2004, 
accomplishing 77.5 percent of its goals.  Focus slipped in the weighted factor rating a 
70.2 percent.  A low performance/highly funded area that brought down the WPR was 
‘Energy-Manage or Influence Resource Use to Enhance Public Benefit, Promote 
Responsible Use, and Ensure Optimal Value’, for it only achieved 64.3 percent of its 14 
performance measures.  MA-2 rated a BER total of $2.893B. 
Only one end outcome goal changed its performance measure, decreasing 
by one performance measure.  This resulted in an overall GCD of -1.  The GCR for MA-
2 was over 80 percent because of the nearly $600M budget increase and consistency in 
maintaining goals.  Overall, this mission area saw a decrease in its GPER rating from 
53.1 in 2004 to 44 in 2005. 
 65
c. Performance Year 2006 
MA-2 experienced a significant increase in raw goal accomplishment 
during 2006; improving performance over 6 percent to 84.6 percent.  Five of the six end 
outcome goals saw consistent performance.  However, one goal, ‘Forest Products-
Manage or Influence Resource Use to Enhance Public Benefit, Promote Responsible Use, 
and Ensure Optimal Value’, experienced a 75 percent decrease in goal performance 
achieving only one of the four stated goals.  The WPR climbed above the raw 
performance rating coming to 90.6 percent. 
Goal consistency for MA-2 remained strong, rating a delta of -1.  Its 
decrease in allocated budget was consistent with the decrease goals rating a GCR of 
101.8 percent.  Overall, MA-2 experienced strong performance throughout in the raw, 
WPR, and GCR measurement areas that resulted in a very strong GPER of 78.    
 
Mission Area 2 (MA-2) Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Goal Met N/A N/A 70.7% 77.5% 84.6% 
WPR N/A N/A 75.0% 70.2% 90.6% 
BER N/A N/A $2.649B $2.893B $3.572B 
GCR N/A N/A N/A 80.8% 101.8% 
GPER N/A N/A 53.1 44.0 78.0 

































Figure 9.   DOI Mission Area 2 Performance Graph 
3. Mission Area 3 (MA-3) – Recreation-Provide Recreation 
Opportunities for America 
a. Performance Year 2004 
MA-3 is the smallest of the four mission areas with a total 2004 allocated 
budget of $2.161B.  Performance for this area was low as it only achieved 56.3 percent 
(9) of its 16 goals.  The WPR was even less at 53.38 percent.  With only two end 
outcome goals, the one more heavily funded, ‘Provide for a Quality Recreation 
Experience, Including Access and Enjoyment of Natural and Cultural Resources on DOI 
Managed and Partnered Lands and Waters’, achieved half of its performance measures; 
directly contributing to the lower WPR percentage.  Conversely, the other goal achieved 
75 percent of its goals.  Overall, MA-3 had a less than stellar GPER of 30.3; purely a 
result of its low goal accomplishment. 
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b. Performance Year 2005 
Year 2005 saw solid improvement in goal performance rating a raw goal 
accomplishment of 80 percent (12) of the 15 performance measures.  The end outcome 
goals achieved 81.8 percent and 75 percent overall.  The WPR produced similarly good 
numbers of 81.3 percent.  At such a high level of performance, it is clear why the BER 
amount was close to the total budgeted amount - $1.502B. 
Only one performance measure changed resulting in a GCD of -1.  
Combine the approximately $300M decrease in budget and strong goal consistency and 
you produce an exceptionally strong GCR of 108.3 percent.  With remarkably good 
performance scores, WPR scores, and a high GCR rating, MA-3 produced a GPER rating 
of 70.4. 
c. Performance Year 2006 
With its 2006 performance, MA-3 has proved the best performing mission 
area for DOI.  The mission area reported outstanding achievement at 100 percent (15) of 
15 goals.  Goal consistence was also good with no change in the number of performance 
measures.  MA-3’s total budget was $66M less than the previous year and hence yielded 
a BER of $1.781B. 
Consistent with the high goal achievement and goal consistency, the GCR 
measured in at 103.6 percent; second highest overall recorded GCR.  So as a product of 
this high rating and ultimate success at goal accomplishment, the GPER weighs in at 








Mission Area 3 (MA-3) Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Goal 
Met 
N/A N/A 56.3% 80.0% 100.0% 
WPR N/A N/A 53.8% 81.3% 100.0% 
BER N/A N/A $1.162B $1.502B $1.781B 
GCR N/A N/A N/A 108.3% 103.6% 
GPER N/A N/A 30.3 70.4 103.6 
Table 17.   DOI Mission Area 3 Performance Summary 
























Figure 10.   DOI Mission Area 3 Performance Graph 
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4. Mission Area 4 (MA-4) – Serving Communities-Safeguard Lives, 
Property and Assets, Advance Scientific Knowledge, and Improve the 
Quality of Life for Communities We Serve 
a. Performance Year 2004 
This mission area represented a large increase in the number of 
performance measures with the total coming to 83.  MA-4 was moderately successful at 
achieving its goals, reporting a 71.1 percent (59) raw accomplishment rate.  The WPR 
was just slightly behind at 70 percent.   
Two of the four-end outcome goals combined for $4.707B of the total 
mission area budgeted amount of $6.781B.  Performance in these two areas was average 
at 72 percent and 60 percent.  The mission area achieved a commensurate BER of 
$4.749B.  Overall, the mission area achieved above average results and earned a GPER 
of 49.8. 
b. Performance Year 2005 
As the budget increased for 2005 (approximately $80M), MA-4’s 
performance dropped by 11.3 percent to an overall accomplishment of 59.8 percent.  This 
drop resulted in a less than optimal BER of $3.835B.  The WPR suffered even more of a 
drop coming in at 55.9 percent (almost 5 percent below the raw rate).   
DOI made a few changes to goals during the year, decreasing by two 
performance measures in ‘Advance Quality Communities for Tribes and Alaska Natives’ 
and increased one in ‘Protect Lives, Resources, and Property’.  This resulted in an overall 
delta of -1 and combined with the budget increase yielded a good GCR of 97.6 percent.  
Overall, MA-4 for 2005 produced a less than average GPER score of 32.6. 
c. Performance Year 2006 
DOI saw a continued slip in performance in 2006 with raw goal 
accomplishment decreasing to 50 percent; resulting in ineffective utilization of the  
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$6.519B budget allocation for this mission area.  Hence, the BER totaled only $3.491B.  
However, the WPR, 53.36, did improve in relation to the raw performance percentage 
over last year’s rating. 
With two end outcome goals decreasing by one performance measure, the 
GCD total was -2.  Combined with the over $300M decrease in budget for MA-4 and 
DOI yielded a good GCR of 102.5 percent.  Overall, MA-4 rated a fair GPER of 27.5. 
Mission Area 4 (MA-4) Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Goal Met N/A N/A 71.1% 59.8% 50.0% 
WPR N/A N/A 70.0% 55.9% 53.6% 
BER N/A N/A $4.749B $3.835B $3.491B 
GCR N/A N/A N/A 97.6% 102.5% 
GPER N/A N/A 49.8 32.6 27.5 
Table 18.   DOI Mission Area 4 Performance Summary 
























Figure 11.   DOI Mission Area 4 Performance Graph 
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5. Strategic Goal (SG) – Manage Excellence-Manage the Department to 
be Highly Skilled, Accountable, Modern, Functionally Integrated, 
Citizen-Centered, and Result-Oriented  
In their Strategic Plan for 2003-2008, DOI established a management focused 
strategic goal whereby management specific end outcome goals were established and 
performance tracked.  Due to the extreme difficulty in assigning budgetary amounts 
(costs already assigned throughout mission area goals), the agency chose to forego 
monetary assignment and concentrate on 24 performance measures across five end 
outcome goal areas: Workforce, Accountability, Modernization, Integration, Customer 
Value.  
a. Performance Year 2004 
DOI completed 58.8 percent (20) of their 34 performance measures in 
2004.  Modernization was the strongest performer with a 100 percent achievement, 
followed by two middle performers in Accountability and Customer Value---achieving 
66.7 percent and 65 percent respectively.  The two underperformers of the group, 
Workforce and Integration rated a zero percent and 16.7 percent respectively.  The one 
and only performance measure for Workforce was ‘Percentage of managers who indicate 
that their workforce has the job-relevant knowledge and skills necessary to accomplish 
the organizational goals.’ 
b. Performance Year 2005 
The year saw a huge swing in the number of performance measures across 
all five areas.  Changes were as minor as Accountability adding one goal to Customer 






Overall performance for 2005 improved year over year to 73.1 percent, 
with three of the five areas in the 70-80 completion percentile.  However, Customer 
Value failed to achieve its only performance measure resulting in zero percent 
accomplishment.  Customer Value and Modernization saw the only year over year 
decrease. 
c. Performance Year 2006 
Performance for the year slid a little as it decreased from around 73 
percent to 67 percent overall; meeting 16 of its 24 goals.  Management continued to 
change goals up and down for a goal consistency delta of -2.  Individually, three of the 
five goals decreased in performance year over year and two remained the same—
Integration and Customer Value, reporting 50 percent and zero percent respectively.   
It appears that Customer Value is the largest underperformer over the 
2004-2006 periods.  An end outcome measure identified for this area is ‘Percentage of 
external customers satisfied with services provided by the Department (survey results)’.  
Without further data, we can only conclude that DOI customers do not feel they are 
receiving expected value from services received. 
 
Strategic Goal Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Goal Met N/A N/A 58.8% 73.1% 66.7% 
WPR N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
BER N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
GCR N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
GPER N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 



























Figure 12.   DOI Strategic Goal Performance Graph 
C. CONCLUSION 
For the 2002-2003 periods, DOI reported increased performance in three of the 
six strategic goals according to the GPER measure.  However, efficient budget execution 
was apparent in only one, leaving the remaining goals achieving around the fifty percent 
range.  Extreme shifting of goals was not evident as only two goals saw moderate 
decreases in the number of performance measures. 
Having a larger performance period to observe, 2004-2006 was indeed a better 
performing period.  Three of its four mission areas saw increasingly better performance 
year over year.  Mission Area 2 experienced a slight decrease in performance in 2005, but 
rebounded significantly the following year.  Mission Area 4 experienced decreased 
performance year over year as a divergence occurred between its GCR and GPER ratings.  




In DOI’s area of management measurement, the Strategic Goal, performance 
increased from 2004 to 2005 but tailed off in 2006.  Two sub-performing areas included 
the Customer Value and Integration focal points.  In summary, it appears that DOI is 
indeed reporting material performance improvements from 2002-2006; however, problem 
areas such as customer satisfaction are evident and in need of improvement.  Our analysis 
suggests that GPRA may have indeed been a catalyst to increased performance and 
effectiveness for DOI.  
 
Goal Achievement Performance Summary 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
MA-1 N/A N/A 52.1% 75.0% 79.2% 
MA-2 N/A N/A 70.7% 77.5% 84.6% 
MA-3 N/A N/A 56.3% 80.0% 100.0% 
MA-4 N/A N/A 71.1% 59.8% 50.0% 
MA-5 N/A N/A 58.8% 73.1% 66.7% 
Table 20.   DOI Goal Achievement Summary 
GPER Performance Summary 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
MA-1 N/A N/A 27.3 44.3 59.2 
MA-2 N/A N/A 53.1 44.0 78.0 
MA-3 N/A N/A 30.3 70.4 103.6 
MA-4 N/A N/A 49.8 32.6 27.5 
MA-5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Table 21.   DOI GPER Performance Summary 
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WPR Performance Summary 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
MA-1 N/A N/A 52.4% 76.1% 79.4% 
MA-2 N/A N/A 75.0% 70.2% 90.6% 
MA-3 N/A N/A 53.8% 81.3% 100.0% 
MA-4 N/A N/A 70.0% 55.9% 53.6% 
MA-5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Table 22.   DOI WPR Performance Summary 
 
BER Performance Summary 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
MA-1 N/A N/A $.212B $.185B $.138B 
MA-2 N/A N/A $2.117B $1.714B $1.429B 
MA-3 N/A N/A $1.359B $.495B $1.034B 
MA-4 N/A N/A $1.359B $.680B $.594B 
MA-5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 









Table 25.   DOI FY 2004 Mission Area 2 Performance Matrix 
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Table 28.   DOI FY 2004 Strategic Goal Performance Matrix 
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Table 29.   DOI FY 2005 Mission Area 1 Performance Matrix 
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Table 30.   DOI FY 2005 Mission Area 2 Performance Matrix 
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Table 31.   DOI FY 2005 Mission Area 3 Performance Matrix 
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Table 32.   DOI FY 2005 Mission Area 4 Performance Matrix 
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Table 33.   DOI FY 2005 Strategic Goal Performance Matrix 
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Table 34.   DOI FY 2006 Mission Area 1 Performance Matrix 
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Table 35.   DOI FY 2006 Mission Area 2 Performance Matrix 
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Table 36.   DOI FY 2006 Mission Area 3 Performance Matrix 
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Table 37.   DOI FY 2006 Mission Area 4 Performance Matrix 
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Table 38.   DOI FY 2006 Strategic Goal Performance Matrix 
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IV. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
ORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION AND STRUCTURE 
The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency was established in 1970 with the 
mission of protecting public health and the environment by working with federal, state, 
tribal and local government partners.72 
The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency employees approximately 17,000 
people across the united states in fields ranging from engineers, scientists and policy 
analysts to legal, public affairs and financial specialists.  The EPA provides many 
services some of which are: 
• Develop and enforce regulations the implement environmental laws 
enacted by Congress. 
• Offer financial assistance in the form of educational grants and 
fellowships, environmental education projects, and state revolving funds. 
• Perform environmental research. 
• Sponsor voluntary partnerships and programs. 
• Further environmental education and inform the public. 
The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency is headquartered in Washington, 
D.C. and has 10 regional offices throughout the country with more than a dozen labs.  
The EPA is a relatively young agency but has achieved much in its short existence.  
During the 1970’s the EPA passed the clean water and clean air acts and sets early human 
exposure levels.  In the 1980’s the Superfund law is passed to help cleanup abandoned 
hazardous waste sites, EPA begins to work with local communities to plan for response 
to environmental emergencies, and EPA begins to use risk science to aid in setting 
priorities.  In the 1990’s amendments to the clean air act strengthen requirements, EPA 
begins to partner with companies to explore voluntary approaches to environmental 
protection, and pollution prevention begins to eliminate pollution before it is generated.  
                                                 
72 Environmental Protection Agency, 2003-2008 strategic plan, 2. 
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So far in the 2000’s the EPA established more stringent restrictions for clean air and 




                                                 
73 Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/, (accessed October 31, 2007). 
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V. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
The EPA from year 2002 to 2003 moved from ten goals to five goals and also 
changed a significant number of their performance measures.  The financial pages in the 
EPA’s 2003 annual report showed a consolidated statement of Net Cost by goal and listed 
the funding according to the ten goals from 2002.  This complicates the analysis of the 
EPA across the five years.  Because of the large shift in goals and the financial reporting 
in 2003 the analysis is broken into two sections.  First years 2002 and 2003 will be 
looked at then a deeper analysis of years 2004 – 2006 will be made.  In essence, year 
2004 acts as a new baseline for analysis for years 2005 and 2006.  Also of note is the fact 
that data for some performance measures may not be available for one or more years to 
indicate if a performance measure was met or not.  An attempt was not made to look at 
later years and update performance measures that were met but not reported until one or 
more years later.  Data available in the subject year’s report only was used for this 
analysis.  The underlying thought process is that data for some measures in 2005 and 
2006 may not be available now and if we updated 2002-2004 data it would skew the data 
for years 2005 and 2006.  That being said, a goal that has many performance measures in 
which data is not available may appear to be underperformers when in fact they may just 
be waiting for data.  An attempt to note these areas during analysis will be made. 
A. PERFORMANCE YEARS 2002-2003 
Analysis of years 2002 and 2003 cannot be done goal by goal.  EPA had ten goals 
for 2002 and reduced this number to five for 2003.  In addition, the cost per goal cannot 
be analyzed as there was a difference in reporting these numbers between 2002 and 2003.  
In 2002, the cost for each of the ten goals was given but in 2003 when the agency shifted 
to five goals they still reported the cost per goal based on the previous years ten goals.  
Attempts to correlate these costs to the five goals used in 2003 were unsuccessful.  As a 
result, it is not possible to compare the Goal Performance Efficiency Rating  
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(GPER) for 2002 and 2003.  What can be looked at for 2002 and 2003 are the goals that 
seemed to perform well and those that did not, also the total number of goals met in 
relation to the total cost for the agency.  
1. Performance Year 2002 
In year 2002, the Environmental Protection Agency had a total of 71 performance 
measures of which it met 48 or 68 percent.  13 performance measures or 18 percent did 
not have data available at the time their 2002 annual report was published.  Of note for 
2002 were goals 7 (Quality environmental information) and 8 (Sound science), both 
achieved 100 percent at meeting their performance measures.  Goal 6 (Reduction of 
global and cross-border environmental risks), on the other hand achieved only 14 percent 
of its performance measures and Goal 1 (Clean air) only achieved 29 percent.  Out of a 
cost of $8,004M the EPA was only effective with approx $5,846M or 68 percent.   
2. Performance Year 2003 
For year 2003, the EPA had a total of 64 performance measures of which it met 
30 or 47 percent.  23 performance measures or 36 percent did not have data available at 
the time their 2003 annual report was published.  Of note for 2003 is goal 1 (Clean air 
and global climate change) which met only 15 percent of its performance measures.  Goal 
1 also has the largest percent of performance measures with data not available at 62 
percent.  With a total cost of $8,800M the EPA was only effective with approx $4,125 or 
47 percent.   
It would appear from the numbers only that the EPA was less effective in 2003 
than it was in 2002, but there were so many changes in goals and performance measures 








Table 39.   EPA FY 2002 Strategic Goal Performance Matrix 
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Table 40.   EPA FY 2003 Strategic Goal Performance Matrix 
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B. PERFORMANCE YEARS 2004-2006 
The year 2004 is used as a new baseline for analysis of years 2004-2006 due to 
the lack of costs assigned to each goal in 2003.   
1. Strategic Goal 1 (SG-1) – Clean Air and Global Climate Change 
The Environmental Protection Agency established the five main goals with the 
2003-2008 strategic plan and have carried these goals forward since.  Within each goal 
are objectives that have distinct performance measures.  Appendix B3-B12 shows the 
compilation of data from the EPA’s annual reports.  Each appendix is a goal that outlines 
the objectives and the number of performance measures in each objective.  The dollar 
amounts shown correlate with each objective.  Some objectives have few performance 
measures and some have many.  The weighted performance rating takes into account the 
cost as spread across all of an objectives performance measures.  For example, strategic 
goal 1 objective 1 has a cost of $597(M) and has 9 performance measures, of which only 
1 was met.  The percentage of goals met would be 11 percent (1 divided by 9), where the 
weighted performance rating (WPR) would be 7.03 percent (percentage of goals met 
times cost for objective 1 divided by entire goal 1 cost).  What this shows is that EPA met 
11 percent of this objectives performance measures but this accounts for only 7.03 
percent of the total goal 1 costs. 
a. Performance Year 2004 
EPA increased the total number of performance measures in goal 1 from 
13 in 2003 to 18 in 2004.  22 percent (4) of their 18 performance measures were met 
accounting for approximately 22.57 percent of the goal 1 total costs.  Objective 1 has the 
most performance measures at 9 with only 1 met and 8 with data not available.  Goal 1 
had 13 of the 18 goals with data not available or 72 percent.  Although this is a large 
number, goal 1 in years 2005 and 2006 will have similar performance measures that have 
data not available and a comparison of goals actually met will be meaningful.  The Goal 
Performance Efficiency Rating (GPER) was 5.02. 
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b. Performance Year 2005 
The performance measures for goal 1 increased from 18 to 19 in 2005.  26 
percent (5) of their 19 performance measures were met, accounting for only 18.69 
percent of the goal 1 total costs.  Again, objective 1 had the most performance measures 
at 8 with 0 met and 8 with data not available.  The GPER was 4.95.  This is a decrease 
from 2004 and can be seen by noting that along with increasing by one performance 
measure the cost for goal 1 also increased.  The weighted performance rating (WPR) 
decreased indicating that a larger percentage of goal 1 costs were spent on performance 
measures that either were not met or did not have data available.  This decrease in GPER 
would indicate a reduction in performance. 
c. Performance Year 2006 
The performance measures for goal 1 increased from 19 to 20 in 2006.  20 
percent (4) of their 20 performance measures were met, accounting for only 15.04 
percent of the goal 1 total costs.  Again, objective 1 had the most performance measures 
at 8 with 1 met and 7 with data not available.  The GPER was 3.38.  This is a decrease 
from 2005 and can be seen by noting that although increasing by one performance 
measure and the cost for goal 1 decreasing.  The weighted performance rating (WPR) 
decreased indicating that a larger percentage of goal 1 costs were spent on performance 
measures that either were not met or did not have data available.  This decrease in GPER 








Strategic Goal 1 (SG-1) Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Goal Met N/A N/A 22.0% 26.0% 20.0% 
WPR N/A N/A 22.6% 18.7% 15.0% 
BER N/A N/A $.212B $.185B $.138B 
GCR N/A N/A N/A 100.57% 112.54% 
GPER N/A N/A 5.02 4.95 3.38 
Table 41.   EPA Strategic Goal 1 Performance Summary 
 




























2. Strategic Goal 2 (SG-2) – Clean and Safe Water 
a. Performance Year 2004 
EPA increased the total number of performance measures in goal 2 from 
11 in 2003 to 13 in 2004.  54 percent (7) of their 13 performance measures were met 
accounting for approximately 52.76 percent of the goal 2 total costs.  Only 1 of the three 
objectives stands out.  Objective 3 achieved both of its performance measures for 100 
percent of performance measures met.  The Goal Performance Efficiency Rating (GPER) 
was 28.41. 
b. Performance Year 2005 
The performance measures for goal 2 increased from 13 to 18 in 2005.  33 
percent (6) of their 18 performance measures were met, accounting for only 48.89 
percent of the goal 2 total costs.  The largest increase in performance measures was in 
objective 1, which increased by 5.  Objective 1 also now has a large number of 
performance measures with data not available at 9 out of 11.  The GPER was 24.62.  This 
is a decrease from 2004 and although EPA increased the number of performance 
measures the cost for goal 1 decreased.  The weighted performance rating (WPR) 
decreased indicating that a larger percentage of goal 2 costs were spent on performance 
measures that either were not met or did not have data available.  This decrease in GPER 
would indicate a reduction in performance. 
c. Performance Year 2006 
The performance measures for goal 2 increased from 18 to 20 in 2006.  30 
percent (6) of their 20 performance measures were met, accounting for only 37.18 
percent of the goal 2 total costs.  Again, objective 1 had the most performance measures 
at 12 with 1 met and 10 with data not available.  The GPER was 11.32.  This is a 
decrease from 2005 and although the number of performance measures increased by 2 
there was also an increase in total cost for goal 2.  The weighted performance rating  
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(WPR) decreased, indicating that a larger percentage of goal 2 costs were spent on 
performance measures that either were not met or did not have data available.  This 
decrease in GPER would indicate a reduction in performance. 
 
Strategic Goal 2 (SG-2) Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Goal Met N/A N/A 54.0% 33.0% 30.0% 
WPR N/A N/A 52.76% 48.89% 37.18% 
BER N/A N/A $2.117B $1.714B $1.429B 
GCR N/A N/A N/A 151.07% 101.53% 
GPER N/A N/A 28.41 24.62 11.32 
Table 42.   EPA Strategic Goal 2 Performance Summary 
 


























Figure 14.   EPA Strategic Goal 2 Performance Graph 
 102
3. Strategic Goal 3 (SG-3) – Land Preservation and Restoration 
a. Performance Year 2004 
EPA decreased the total number of performance measures in goal 3 from 9 
in 2003 to 7 in 2004.  57 percent (4) of their 7 performance measures were met 
accounting for approximately 67.21 percent of the goal 3 total costs.  Objective 2 has the 
most performance measures at 4 with 3 met and 1 with data not available.  Objective 2 
also has the largest cost by a significant amount so any change in meeting performance 
measures within objective 2 will have a large impact the WPR and the GPER.  The Goal 
Performance Efficiency Rating (GPER) was 38.41. 
b. Performance Year 2005 
The performance measures for goal 3 remained at 7 from 2004 to 2005.  
29 percent (2) of their 7 performance measures were met, accounting for only 24.54 
percent of the goal 3 total costs.  Again, objective 2 had the most performance measures 
at 4 with only 1 met and 3 not met.  The GPER was 7.03.  This is a decrease from 2004 
and although the number of goals did not change and the budget only increased slightly 
there was a decrease in the number of performance measures met.  The weighted 
performance rating (WPR) decreased indicating that a larger percentage of goal 3 costs 
were spent on performance measures that either were not met or did not have data 
available.  This decrease in GPER would indicate a reduction in performance. 
c. Performance Year 2006 
The performance measures for goal 3 remained at 7 from 2005 to 2006.  
57 percent (4) of their 7 performance measures were met, accounting for 65.39 percent of 
the goal 3 total costs.  Objective 2 had the largest impact on the WPR as 3 of the 4  
performance measures were met in 2006.  The GPER was 45.43, which is a great increase 
over 2005 and is even better than the 2004 performance.  This increase is due to more 
performance measures being met but also because goal 3 saw a reduction in cost for  
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2006.  The weighted performance rating (WPR) increased indicating that a larger 
percentage of goal 3 costs were spent on performance measures that met their objectives.  
This increase in GPER would indicate an increase in performance. 
 
Strategic Goal 3 (SG-3) Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Goal Met N/A N/A 57.0% 29.0% 57.0% 
WPR N/A N/A 67.21% 24.54% 65.39% 
BER N/A N/A $1.359B $.495B $1.034B 
GCR N/A N/A N/A 100.30% 121.58% 
GPER N/A N/A 38.41 7.03 45.43 
 
Table 43.   EPA Strategic Goal 3 Performance Summary 
 

























Figure 15.   EPA Strategic Goal 3 Performance Graph 
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4. Strategic Goal 4 (SG-4) – Healthy Communities and Ecosystems 
a. Performance Year 2004 
EPA increased the total number of performance measures in goal 4 from 
16 in 2003 to 23 in 2004.  52 percent (12) of their 23 performance measures were met 
accounting for approximately 53.32 percent of the goal 4 total costs.  Objectives 1 and 4 
have the most performance measures at 8 and 7 respectively, but where objective 1 met 0 
performance measures objective 4 met all 7.  The Goal Performance Efficiency Rating 
(GPER) was 27.82. 
b. Performance Year 2005 
The performance measures for goal 4 increased from 23 to 26 in 2005.  50 
percent (13) of their 26 performance measures were met, accounting for 53.44 percent of 
the goal 4 total costs.  Again, objectives 1 and 4 had the most performance measures at 
10 and 7 respectively.  Objective one only met 2 performance measures where objective 
4 met all 7.  The GPER was 27.17.  This is a slight decrease from 2004.  The increase in 
their performance measures was accompanied with and increase in costs, which in the 
end, causes the GPER to decrease slightly.  This decrease in GPER would indicate a 
reduction in performance. 
c. Performance Year 2006 
The performance measures for goal 4 decreased from 26 to 20 in 2006.  45 
percent (9) of their 20 performance measures were met, accounting for only 48.14 
percent of the goal 4 total costs.  Performance measures were removed from objectives 1, 
3, and 4, but instead of meeting all performance measures in objective 4, only 2 were met 
out of 4.  The GPER was 17.34.  This is a decrease from 2005 and even though the 
number of performance measures was reduced by 6 the cost for goal 4 only decreased 




GPER.  This indicates that a larger percentage of goal 4 costs were spent on performance 
measures that either were not met or did not have data available.  This decrease in GPER 
would indicate a reduction in performance. 
 
Strategic Goal 4 (SG-4) Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Goal Met N/A N/A 52.0% 50.0% 45.0% 
WPR N/A N/A 67.21% 53.44% 48.14% 
BER N/A N/A $1.359B $.680B $.594B 
GCR N/A N/A N/A 101.67% 80.07% 
GPER N/A N/A 38.41 27.17 17.34 
 
Table 44.   EPA Strategic Goal 4 Performance Summary 
 
























Figure 16.   EPA Strategic Goal 4 Performance Graph 
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5. Strategic Goal 5 (SG-5) – Compliance and Environmental 
Stewardship 
a. Performance Year 2004 
The total number of performance measures in goal 5 remained the same as 
for 2003 at 10.  80 percent (8) of their 10 performance measures were met accounting for 
approximately 81.73 percent of the goal 5 total costs.  Objective 1 has the most 
performance measures at 6, all of which were met.  Objective 2 has 2 performance 
measures with data not available for either.  The Goal Performance Efficiency Rating 
(GPER) was 65.38. 
b. Performance Year 2005 
The performance measures for goal 5 decreased from 10 to 7 in 2005.  29 
percent (2) of their 7 performance measures were met, accounting for only 32.54 percent 
of the goal 5 total costs.  Again, objective 1 had the most performance measures at 3 with 
1 met and 2 not met.  The GPER was 6.55.  The decrease in objectives with only a token 
decrease in costs coupled with a low number of performance measures met accounts for 
this large decrease in the GPER.  This decrease in GPER would indicate a reduction in 
performance. 
c. Performance Year 2006 
The performance measures for goal 5 increased from 7 to 8 in 2006.  13 
percent (1) of their 8 performance measures were met, accounting for only 21.17 percent 
of the goal 5 total costs.  The GPER was 2.82.  The addition of one goal was 
accompanied with a cost increase of almost 8 percent.  This with the reduction of 
performance measures met account for the decrease in the GPER.  This decrease in 





Strategic Goal 5 (SG-5) Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Goal Met N/A N/A 80.0% 29.0% 13.0% 
WPR N/A N/A 81.73% 32.54% 21.17% 
BER N/A N/A $.586B $.232B $.163B 
GCR N/A N/A N/A 70.42% 106.44% 
GPER N/A N/A 65.38 6.55 2.82 
Table 45.   EPA Strategic Goal 5 Performance Summary 

























Figure 17.   EPA Strategic Goal 5 Performance Graph 
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C. CONCLUSION 
According to the methods used for analysis of the GPRA required reports, it is not 
evident that the Environmental Protection Agency’s performance is improving.  This 
analysis indicates that the EPA is spending more and achieving fewer results over time.   
EPA failed to show improvement in meeting its established goals as the 
evaluation period progressed.  The goal accomplishment rate for every strategic goal 
except SG-3 actually dropped significantly from 2002 to 2006.  SG-3’s rate started at 57 
percent, dropped to 29 percent in 2005, then rebounded to 57 percent to close out the 
period in 2006.  These rate trends are not indicative of an agency that is performing more 
effectively. 
 
Goal Achievement Performance Summary 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SG-1 N/A N/A 22.0% 26.0% 20.0% 
SG-2 N/A N/A 54.0% 33.0% 30.0% 
SG-3 N/A N/A 57.0% 29.0% 57.0% 
SG-4 N/A N/A 52.0% 50.0% 45.0% 
SG-5 N/A N/A 80.0% 29.0% 13.0% 
Table 46.   EPA Goal Achievement Summary 
It should be noted that EPA’s management engaged in active management of the 
agency’s goals throughout the evaluation period.  The GCR ratings for the strategic goals 
were inconsistent as EPA significantly modified the number of its goals from year to 
year.  This made it difficult to track goal performance throughout the rating period. 
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EPA’s GPER performance also demonstrated an overall decline across four of the 
five goals.  The only strategic goal revealing improvement in the GPER measure was SG-
3, which climbed moderately from 38.41 in 2004 to 45.43 in 2006.  However, SG-2, SG-
4 and SG-5 fell by more than 50 percent between 2004 and 2006.  These declines 
indicated eroding performance effectiveness for EPA. 
 
GPER Performance Summary 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SG-1 N/A N/A 5.02 4.95 3.38 
SG-2 N/A N/A 28.41 24.62 11.32 
SG-3 N/A N/A 38.41 7.03 45.43 
SG-4 N/A N/A 38.41 27.17 17.34 
SG-5 N/A N/A 65.38 6.55 2.82 
Table 47.   EPA GPER Performance Summary 
 
The WPR measure revealed a decrease in effective use of resources for every 
strategic goal from 2004 to 2006.  These declines, though not particularly severe, 
definitely indicate that EPA did not demonstrate an increase in performance effectiveness 
during the latter evaluation period.  SG-5’s WPR decreased most notably, from over 80 
percent in 2002 to just below 22 percent in 2006.  It is expected that a more effective 
agency would also capitalize on its resources more effectively; the analysis revealed that 





WPR Performance Summary 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SG-1 N/A N/A 22.6% 18.7% 15.0% 
SG-2 N/A N/A 52.76% 48.89% 37.18% 
SG-3 N/A N/A 67.21% 24.54% 65.39% 
SG-4 N/A N/A 67.21% 53.44% 48.14% 
SG-5 N/A N/A 81.73% 32.54% 21.17% 
Table 48.   EPA WPR Performance Summary 
The BER is closely related to the WPR and attempts to show in dollars how 
effectively EPA used its allotted resources.  Similar to the WPR measures, EPA’s BER 
dropped consistently from 2004 to 2006 for every strategic goal (except for a slight 
increase from the previous year in SG-3).  Every goal showed a significantly lower BER 
in 2006 than it started with in 2004.  Again, these measures reveal EPA’s lower level of 
performance related to effective resource use. 
 
BER Performance Summary 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SG-1 N/A N/A $.212B $.185B $.138B 
SG-2 N/A N/A $2.117B $1.714B $1.429B 
SG-3 N/A N/A $1.359B $.495B $1.034B 
SG-4 N/A N/A $1.359B $.680B $.594B 
SG-5 N/A N/A $.586B $.232B $.163B 
Table 49.   EPA BER Performance Summary 
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The analysis indicated that the EPA spent more and achieved fewer results during 
the evaluation period.  The reporting requirements of GPRA appear to have had little 
influence on initiating material improvements in program effectiveness and public 






















Table 54.   EPA FY 2004 Strategic Goal 5 Performance Matrix 
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Table 63.   EPA FY 2006 Strategic Goal 4 Performance Matrix 
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Table 64.   EPA FY 2006 Strategic Goal 5 Performance Matrix 
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VI. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS BACKGROUND 
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was established in 1833 as the Bureau 
of Pensions, a part of the Department of War.  Its history dates even earlier through the 
Nation’s efforts to grant its Revolutionary War veterans and their families’ compensation 
for disabilities and loss of life.74  VA evolved in name, scope and focus as the Nation 
grew, and assumed its current title and stature as a cabinet under President Ronald 
Reagan in 1989.75 
VA’s stated mission is “to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his 
widow and his orphan,” adapted from President Abraham Lincoln’s charge to Congress 
in his second inaugural address in 18.76  VA is also guided by a distinct vision to meet the 
needs of the America’s veterans and their families in several ways:77 
• Becoming an even more veteran-focused organization, functioning as a 
single, comprehensive provider of seamless service to the men and women 
who have served our Nation;  
• Cultivating a dedicated VA workforce of highly skilled employees who 
understand, believe in, and take pride in our vitally important mission; 
• Continuously benchmarking the quality and delivery of our service with 
the best in business and use innovative means and high technology to 
deliver world-class service;  
• Fostering partnerships with veteran’s organizations, the Department of 
Defense and other federal agencies, state and local veterans organizations, 
and other stakeholders to leverage resources and enhance the quality of 
services provided to veterans. 
                                                 
74 Department of Veterans Affairs. VA History in Brief, 4, 
http://www1.va.gov/opa/feature/history/docs/histbrf.pdf, (accessed 15 November 2007). 
75 Ibid., 26. 
76 Ibid., 5. 
77 Department of Veterans Affairs. About VA, http://www.va.gov/about_va/mission.asp, (accessed 15 
November 2007). 
 128
To carry out this mission and vision, VA has 20 staff organizations and offices, 
and is organized into three administrations:  Veterans Health Administration, Veterans 
Benefits Administration, and National Cemetery Administration.78 
• The Veterans Health Administration serves the needs of America's 
veterans by providing primary care, specialized care, and related medical 
and social support services. 
• The mission of the Veterans Benefits Administration is to provide benefits 
and services to the veterans and their families in a responsive, timely and 
compassionate manner in recognition of their service to the Nation. 
• The National Cemetery Administration honors veterans with final resting 
places in national shrines and with lasting tributes that commemorate their 
service to our nation.  
As of September 30, 2007, VA employs 254,183 people, and administers 
programs for an estimated 23.5 million veterans.79  The table below shows various VA 
and veteran-related statistics, and offers insight into the extent of VA’s mission. 
                                                 
78 Department of Veterans Affairs. VA Organizations, http://www.va.gov/landing_organizations.htm, 
(accessed November 15, 2007). 
79 Department of Veterans Affairs. Veteran Data and Information, http://www1.va.gov/vetdata/, 
(accessed November 15, 2007). 
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Table 65.   VA Statistics (From: VA Statistics at a Glance80) 
                                                 
80 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran Data and Information, http://www1.va.gov/vetdata/, 
(accessed November 15, 2007). 
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VII. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS PERFORMANCE 
ANALYSIS 
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) clearly presented its performance and 
accountability reports in an easily readable, transparent fashion.  The Mercatus Center at 
George Mason University, a non-profit entity that evaluates public sector management 
through research and analysis of organizational effectiveness, rated VA as number two of 
twenty-four federal agencies in its FY 2006 annual performance report scorecard.81  (See 
Table 98 for the complete scorecard.)  The Center’s scorecard evaluates entities’ 
performance reports on the basis of readability, as well as “the fullness and accuracy of 
their disclosure.”82 
Additionally, VA was recognized by the Vice President’s National Partnership for 
Reinventing Government as the “government leader in plain language writing.”83  The 
clarity and readability of VA’s annual performance reports support this recognition. 
VA’s goals and objectives remained relatively static over the period of analysis.  
To illustrate this point, according to the 2006 Performance and Accountability Report, 82 
percent of VA’s key performance measures have been in place for at least three years.84  
Though the reporting format changed slightly in 2004, the objectives, goals and 
performance measures are easily tracked from one reporting period to the next. 
VA developed four strategic goals and one enabling goal to guide its efforts.  
These goals were derived from the long-term vision described in the VA’s strategic plan.  
The strategic plans outline the direction of the organization five years into the future.  
Two strategic plans relate to the scope of this project:  2001-2006 and 2005-2010.  The  
 
                                                 
81 Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 8th Annual Performance Report Scorecard, April 
2007, 6. 
82 Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Annual Performance Report Scorecard, 
http://www.mercatus.org/programs/pageID.350,programID.4/default.asp, (accessed October 29, 2007). 
83 Department of Veterans Affairs, 2001-2006 Strategic Plan, 2001, i. 
84 Department of Veterans Affairs, FY 2006 Performance and Accountability Report, November 15, 
2006, 19. 
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plans cover a five-year period, but are reviewed and updated as necessary.  Year 
references related to performance and accountability reports are given in fiscal years (FY) 
unless stated otherwise. 
VA’s objectives, goals, and related performance measures remained relatively 
consistent throughout the evaluation period.  The 2002 Performance and Accountability 
Report states that most of the department’s performance measures remain the same from 
year to year, but certain measures may be replaced or dropped if actual performance 
consistently surpasses the target and “further performance improvements are unlikely or 
unreasonable.”85 
One of the aims of GPRA is to ensure government agencies actually achieve their 
intended objectives and accomplish their overall missions.  Each year the VA designates 
several key goals that it states are central to its mission.  The department must be 
proficient in these critical capabilities to successfully and effectively accomplish its 
mission.   
Inherent to performance-based budgeting incentives, VA is mindful of the need to 
link performance of its departments with its budget plan.  VA conducts monthly review 
meetings with high-level staff to discuss performance, and the results are briefed to senior 
leadership within the department.86 
The analysis in this project focused on the goals VA designated as key goals, 
which are critical to the success of the VA mission.  The expectation was that if the 
department designated a goal or measurement as particularly critical to its overall success 
as an entity, then the critical activity should be one of the agency’s competencies, and the 
performance in that critical area should demonstrate success.  Management should be 
especially mindful of its operations and processes in those key areas to ensure the 
department’s constituency is effectively served by that function.  As stated in the strategic  
 
                                                 
85 Department of Veterans Affairs, FY 2002 Performance and Accountability Report, January 2003, 
44. 
86 Department of Veterans Affairs, FY 2006 Performance and Accountability Report, November 15, 
2006, 17. 
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plan, “VA’s effectiveness will be determined by how well the needs and expectations of 
veterans are met.”87  VA focuses its goals on output/outcome and efficiency, not on 
input. 
This analysis will examine performance by evaluating the performance results 
related to each strategic goal across the five-year evaluation period, from 2002 through 
2006.  The intent is to determine if the performance and accountability reports 
demonstrate improved performance.  First, a summary of the evaluation period’s macro-
level performance encompassing all five objectives will be presented, followed by a more 
detailed analysis of each strategic goal across the five-year evaluation period. 
VA’s four strategic goals and one enabling goal are outlined here, as defined by 
the 2002 performance and accountability report.88 Each goal, along with its respective 
objectives, will be provided as a reference at the outset of each goal’s performance 
analysis.  Though minor wording changes occurred from year to year, the focus of each 
goal remained fixed. 
• Strategic Goal One (SG-1):  Restore the capability of veterans with 
disabilities to the greatest extent possible and improve the quality of their 
lives and that of their families. 
• Strategic Goal Two (SG-2):  Ensure a smooth transition for veterans from 
active military service to civilian life. 
• Strategic Goal Three (SG-3):  Honor and serve veterans in life and 
memorialize them in death for their sacrifice on behalf of the Nation. 
• Strategic Goal Four (SG-4):  Contribute to the public health, emergency 
management, socioeconomic well-being, and history of the Nation. 
• Enabling Goal (SG-5):  Deliver world-class service to veterans and their 
families by applying sound business principles that result in effective 
management of people, communications, technology and governance. 
A. DEPARTMENT PERFORMANCE OVERVIEW 
The VA designated 23 key performance goals for 2002, and successfully achieved 
17 (77 percent) of those goals.  Though well short of complete success, VA demonstrated 
                                                 
87 Department of Veterans Affairs. 2001-2006 Strategic Plan, ii. 
88 Department of Veterans Affairs, FY 2002 Performance and Accountability Report, January 2003, 7. 
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improvement in these critical areas compared to performance in the previous fiscal year, 
when the organization achieved 58 percent of its key goals.89  VA obligations for the year 
totaled $58.899B.   
There were 27 key performance goals in 2003, 25 of which had established 
targets.  VA successfully achieved 16 (64 percent) of its goals—a drop in the 
achievement rate by 13 percentage points compared to last year’s performance.  VA 
obligations for the year totaled $41.341B, a significant decrease of 29.8 percent from 
2002.  
VA achieved 59 percent (13) of its 22 key performance goals for 2004, marking 
the second consecutive year of decreasing goal achievement.  However, the department 
did manage to improve measured performance on 18 percent of the goals it failed to 
achieve.  Total obligations for 2004 reached $41.459B, a slight increase of $118 million 
over the previous year. 
The goal achievement rate continued to slide in 2005, when VA achieved only 58 
percent (14) of its 24 key measures.  Similar to 2003, however, performance improved on 
17 percent of the unachieved goals.  Total obligations increased by a substantial 23.7 
percent ($9.832B) over 2004, reaching $51.291B.   
VA was able to improve its goal achievement significantly in 2006, the final year 
of the evaluation period, when it achieved 65 percent (15) of its 23 key measure targets.  
Obligations increased by a remarkable $27.327B, or 53.3 percent, to a total of $78.618B 
for the year.   
Overall, VA’s obligations increased nearly $20B from $58.899B in 2002 to 
$78.618B in 2006, a 33.5 percent gain (not adjusted for inflation).  At the start of the 
evaluation period the achievement rate for key goal performance was 77 percent; the rate 
recovered to 65 percent at the end of the evaluation period after reaching a low of 58 
percent. 
                                                 
89 Department of Veterans Affairs, FY 2002 Performance and Accountability Report, January 2003, 6. 
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VA addresses several specific management challenges in its performance and 
accountability reports.  It is reasonable to assume that those challenges, along with other 
factors, impacted the performance of the department and hampered VA’s ability to 
achieve its key performance goals. 
1. Strategic Goal 1 (SG-1) 
a. Performance Year 2002 
Strategic goal one (SG-1) states the VA’s intent to “Restore the capability 
of veterans with disabilities to the greatest extent possible and improve the quality of 
their lives and that of their families.”90  This goal accounted for 62.4 percent, or 
$36.761B, of total VA obligations for 2002.  The goal is supported by four objectives:91 
• Maximize the physical, mental, and social functioning of veterans with 
disabilities and be recognized as a leader in the provision of specialized 
health care services.  This objective accounts for 21.8 percent of VA 
resources. 
• Provide timely and accurate decisions on disability compensation claims 
to improve the economic status and quality of life of service-disabled 
veterans.  This objective accounts for 39.2 percent of VA resources. 
• Provide all service-disabled veterans with the opportunity to become 
employable and obtain and maintain suitable employment, while 
providing special support to veterans with serious employment handicaps.  
This objective accounts for one percent of VA resources. 
• Improve the standard of living and income status of eligible survivors of 
service-disabled veterans through compensation, education, and insurance 
benefits.  This objective accounts for four-tenths of one percent of VA 
resources. 
VA achieved only 25 percent of its four SG-1 performance targets in 
2002.  The department failed to attain both of its measures for SG-4.2, the activity that 
accounted for nearly 63 percent of the obligations in this goal.  This heavily influenced 
the strategic goal’s WPR (34.9 percent), and led to a low GPER of 8.7. 
                                                 
90 Department of Veterans Affairs, FY 2002 Performance and Accountability Report, January 2003, 7. 
91 Ibid., 45. 
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The BER was established by the achievement of the sole measurement in 
SG-4.1; its sizeable budget (34.9 percent of the goal’s obligations) translated to an overall 
BER of $12.820B. 
b. Performance Year 2003 
Goal accomplishment actually dropped in 2003 after two additional 
performance measures were added to the disability claims processing program activity, 
resulting in a 16.7 percent goal accomplishment rate and an even lower GPER of 8.2.  
The strategic goal’s overall WPR remained relatively static at 35.9 percent, due to the 
sizeable obligations incurred by SG-1.1, which accounted for nearly 36 percent of SG-1’s 
total obligations.   
The performance measure for SG-1.1 was replaced by a new focus target 
related to homeless veteran living arrangements after the original goal showed a 
consistent record of high achievement.  It should also be noted that SG-1.2’s target was 
tightened by 26 percent, but performance fell short by only 10 percent of the more 
challenging goal. 
The addition of two performance measures drove the GCR to relatively 
high 137.5 percent, establishing a fairly inflated baseline early in the evaluation period. 
c. Performance Year 2004  
Several performance measures changed in 2004, including the addition of 
four new targets (including three for SG-1.4) and the elimination of one measure related 
to obtaining service medical records in SG-1.2.  The changes drove the GCR higher to 
149.7 percent.   
The GPR was low at 18.1, driven by a WPR of 32.5 percent.  Though 55 
percent of the performance targets were achieved, the majority of obligated resources did 
not correspond to goal accomplishment, leading to a BER of $13.484B.  SG-1.2 failed to 
achieve any of its three performance targets, and with 66 percent of SG-1’s obligations, 
its nonperformance significantly influenced the poor performance ratings. 
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This low WPR highlights the significance and importance of performance-
based budgeting, which encourages the effective and efficient use of allotted resources, 
and holds activities accountable for performance.  VA used nearly $28B in resources for 
two performance activities in this strategic goal but failed to accomplish its intended 
goals with those resources.  
d. Performance Year 2005 
The GPR dropped by nearly 65 percent in 2005, from 17.6 to 6.2, driven 
by a significant decrease in the GCR after two performance measures were eliminated 
from SG-1.4, along with a large decrease to 28.6 percent in the goal accomplishment rate.     
The WPR improved slightly to 39.9 percent and the BER increased to 
$20.481B as SG-1.1’s obligations increased by over 40 percent.  The larger obligation 
amount for helped boost SG-1’s WPR, but the impact of the goal changes was difficult to 
overcome.  
It should be noted that the targets for SG-1.1 and 1.4 were made 
significantly more stringent, yet the activity still achieved SG-1.1.  However, SG-1.2’s 
target was eased noticeably by 39 days (nearly 50 percent), yet the activity still failed to 
achieve the goal.  Performance actually worsened by two days pending time for disability 
compensation claim settlement. 
e. Performance Year 2006 
VA’s performance in SG-1 improved dramatically in 2006.  The activity 
achieved 83.3 percent of its goals, well above its 28.6 percent in 2005.  The GPER also 
jumped ten-fold to 63.1, and the GCR increased slightly to 76.3 percent.  More 
importantly, the WPR increased to 99.3 percent after the SG-1.2 activity reached all three 
of its performance targets.  Its sizeable portion (56.7 percent) of SG-1’s obligations 
helped boost the BER as well, achieving a notable $55.723B out of $56.127B in 
obligations.   
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This period’s performance measures demonstrate an effective use of 
entrusted resources, and imply efficient stewardship and accountability over resources. 
f. Summary for Evaluation Period 
The table below summarizes the results of the five main evaluation tools 
for SG-1 in this evaluation period.  The comprehensive results do not clearly demonstrate 
improvement across the evaluation period, even with the stellar performance in 2006.  
The goal achievement percentage vacillates wildly each year, and the WPR shows only 
nominal improvement in two years.  The BER, a “bang for the buck” measure, improves 
in three of the four years, but the GPER remains low except for the final year.  The strong 
high numbers in 2006 almost give the appearance of outliers, and were driven by an 
almost three-fold improvement in the goal achievement rate as VA accomplished five 
objectives in 2006, compared to two in 2005.  This is a notable achievement from 
previous years, but this positive sign of improving performance effectiveness is not a 
consistent trend. 
 
Strategic Goal 1 (SG-1) Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Goal Met 25.0% 16.7% 55.6% 28.6% 83.3% 
WPR 34.9% 35.9% 32.5% 39.9% 99.3% 
BER $12.820B $14.850B $13.484B $20.481B $55.723B 
GCR N/A 137.5% 149.7% 54.1% 76.3% 
GPER 8.7 8.2 18.1 6.2 63.1 
Table 66.   VA Strategic Goal 1 Performance Summary 
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Figure 18.   VA Strategic Goal 1 Performance Graph 
2. Strategic Goal 2 (SG-2) 
a. Performance Year 2002 
Strategic goal two (SG-2) describes the VA’s intent to “Ensure a smooth 
transition for veterans from active military service to civilian life.”92  This goal accounted 
for 5.7 percent, or $3.361B, of total VA obligations for 2002.  The goal is supported by 
three objectives:93 
• Ease the reentry of new veterans into civilian life by increasing awareness 
of, access to, and use of VA health care, benefits and services.  This 
objective accounts for 1.2 percent of VA resources. 
• Provide timely and accurate decisions on education claims and continue 
payments at appropriate levels to enhance veterans’ and servicemembers’ 
ability to achieve educational and career goals.  This objective accounts 
for 2.7 percent of VA resources. 
                                                 
92 Department of Veterans Affairs, FY 2002 Performance and Accountability Report, January 2003, 7. 
93 Ibid., 58. 
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• Improve the ability of veterans to purchase and retain a home by meeting 
or exceeding lending industry standards for quality, timeliness, and 
foreclosure avoidance.  This objective accounts for 1.8 percent of VA 
resources. 
VA achieved 100 percent of its three performance measures with 
established targets in 2002, which led to a GPER of 78.3 and a WPR of 78.3 percent.  
These ratings infer an effective use of resources.  The BER for this year was $2.631B; 
$730M (21.7 percent) of total obligations did not have a related performance target.    
b. Performance Year 2003 
VA achieved four of its five performance measures in 2003, even with the 
addition of two new measures and a noticeable increase in a third target.  The GCD of 
plus two led to a sizeable GCR of 156.6 percent.   
This period’s performance helped the agency achieve a 112.6 GPER and a 
WPR of nearly 90 percent, both sizeable increases over 2002.  Worth noting is VA’s 
performance related to the timely processing of original and supplemental education 
claims, which improved by an average of 41 percent.  These measures indicate an 
effective use of resources. 
c. Performance Year 2004 
The GPER dropped significantly to 10.9 as VA achieved only 33 percent 
of its six performance measures in 2004.  The BER also dropped from $3.333B to 
$1.069B as the WPR dipped to 32.6 percent, a 64 percent decrease from 2003.   
These scores were driven mainly by the performance in SG-2.2.  Though 
VA added and achieved a new measurement target, it missed both previously existing 
targets in this heavily-funded objective, which comprised 68 percent of this strategic 
goal’s resources.  These low scores indicate an ineffective use of resources as 
performance dropped in these key activities. 
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d. Performance Year 2005 
Even with a gentle easing of targets in 2005, VA achieved only 33.3 
percent of its performance measures.  This low achievement rate led to a GPER of only 
3.6, the second consecutive decreasing year.  However, the WPR climbed to 52.6 percent, 
boosted by the target achievement in SG-2.3, which accounted for 35 percent of SG-2’s 
budget.   
e. Performance Year 2006 
SG-2’s GPER recovered to 39.9 in 2006 as the WPR increased slightly to 
60.5 percent.  Goal achievement also improved to 60 percent, perhaps aided by the 
elimination of one performance measure in SG-2.1.  Even with a GCD of minus one, the 
GCR increased significantly to 109.9 percent, evidently driven by a $1.5B reduction in 
total obligations compared to 2005.  With a smaller amount of total resources this year, 
SG-2’s BER was not impacted as severely for its 40 percent non-performance. 
f. Summary for Evaluation Period 
As shown in the performance summary table below, SG-2 does not clearly 
demonstrate improved performance over the evaluation period.  Both the goal 
achievement and the GPER dropped considerably in 2004 and 2005 before a meager 
recovery in 2006.  The BER was also inconsistent, dropping in two of the four years 
following the first year’s measure.  The WPR showed increases three of four years, but 









Strategic Goal Two (SG-2) Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 % Goal Met 100% 80.0% 33.3% 33.3% 60.0% 
WPR 78.3% 89.9% 32.6% 52.6% 60.5% 
BER $2.631B $3.333B $1.069B $3.103B $2.621B 
GCR N/A 156.5% 100% 20.3% 109.9% 
GPER 78.3 112.6 10.9 3.6 39.9 
Table 67.   VA Strategic Goal 2 Performance Summary 
 



























Figure 19.   VA Strategic Goal 2 Performance Graph 
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3. Strategic Goal 3 (SG-3) 
a. Performance Year 2002 
Strategic goal three (SG-3) defines the VA’s intent to “Honor and serve 
veterans in life and memorialize them in death for their sacrifices on behalf of the 
Nation.”94  This goal accounted for 28.5 percent, or $16.776B, of total VA obligations for 
2002.  The goal is supported by five objectives:95 
• Provide high quality, reliable, accessible, timely and efficient health care 
that maximizes the health and functional status for all enrolled veterans, 
with special focus on veterans with service-connected conditions, those 
unable to defray the cost, and those statutorily eligible for care.  This 
objective accounts for 18.8 percent of VA resources. 
• Process pension claims in a timely and accurate manner to provide eligible 
veterans and their survivors a level of income that raises their standard of 
living and sense of dignity.  This objective accounts for 5.8 percent of VA 
resources. 
• Maintain a high level of service to insurance policy holders and their 
beneficiaries to enhance the financial security of veterans’ families.  This 
objective accounts for 3.4 percent of VA resources. 
• Ensure that the burial needs of veterans and eligible family members are 
met.  This objective accounts for four-tenths of one percent of VA 
resources. 
• Provide veterans and their families with timely and accurate symbolic 
expressions of remembrance.  This objective accounts for one-tenth of one 
percent of VA resources. 
VA achieved 64.3 percent of its performance targets in 2002, including an 
88 percent achievement rate in its most highly-funded program activity (SG-3.1).  Seven 
of eight goals were met in SG-3.1, and with 66 percent ($11B) of the goal’s total 
obligations, this activity contributed extensively to SG-1’s WPR of 70.3 percent with a 
rate of 57.7 percent.  The GPER for the evaluation period was established at 45.2. 
                                                 
94 Department of Veterans Affairs, FY 2002 Performance and Accountability Report, January 2003, 8. 
95 Ibid., 67. 
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b. Performance Year 2003 
The GPER and WPR both dropped slightly (30.8 percent and 69.1 percent, 
respectively) in 2003, even with a relatively static goal completion rate of 63.6 percent.  
The rate drops can rationally be attributed to the establishment of the GCR at 70 percent.  
The GCD was a significant minus three, as total performance measurements dropped 
from 14 to 11.  Additionally, two measures were replaced in SG-3.1 and SG-3.5.   
It should be noted that VA aspired to improve service to beneficiaries by 
improving its service delivery in the insurance policy realm by tightening its target by 
17.6 percent.  VA successfully met this more aggressive goal. 
Total obligations increased by approximately $1.5B for SG-3, yet the 
corresponding BER increased by only $792M.   
c. Performance Year 2004 
The obligations for SG-3 drastically increased by nearly 28 percent 
($5.072B) to $23.293B in 2004, and the BER showed an even greater increase by over 56 
percent to $19.669B.   
VA met 13 of its nine performance measures in SG-3 for a 69 percent 
achievement rate, which helped deliver an 84.4 percent WPR.  Accounting for over 75 
percent of the strategic goal’s total obligations, SG-3.1 was the most effective contributor 
to the WPR and BER, with an activity WPR of 75.4 percent and BER of $17.568B. 
All six of SG-3.1’s performance measures were achieved, but none of SG-
3.3’s three targets were achieved.  Two new performance measures were added to SG-
3.3, leading to a GCD of plus 2 and contributing to a GCR of 108.7 percent, as well as a 
GPER of 58.5.  This GPER was an 89.9 percent increase over last year’s GPER of 30.8. 
d. Performance Year 2005 
There was considerable performance measurement activity in 2005 for 
SG-3, as all five of the program activities modified measurement targets and the GCR 
increased to 153.2 percent.  All objective targets were appreciably more stringent this 
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year, except for the targets in SG-3.2, which relate to claims accuracy rate and timeliness.  
(VA has yet to achieve the performance targets for SG-3.2 in the 2002-2005 evaluation 
range.)  VA would have achieved its target in SG-3.4 had it not tightened its achievement 
window by three percentage points from 2004.  VA should be credited for its apparent 
initiatives to improve service delivery to its beneficiaries of SG-3 activities. 
VA met 60 percent of its performance targets in 2005, a slight decrease 
since 2004, and also incurred a 16 percentage-point drop in the WPR (to 68.7 percent).  
The goal’s obligations also dropped considerably to $14.492B (60.7 percent), but its BER 
decreased by only 49 percent to $9.960B, inferring VA was able to effectively capitalize 
a greater portion of its smaller budget.  The GPER for 2005 was 63.2. 
e. Performance Year 2006 
The goal achievement rate increased to 73.3 percent in 2006, but this 
higher score was facilitated by a less stringent target in SG-3.2.  An additional 40 days to 
process pension claims enabled VA to meet its target for this performance measurement.  
Conversely, the targets for SG-3.4 and 3.5 were more stringent and required improved 
performance to achieve targeted performance (VA met one of those three performance 
measures).  The GCR dropped substantially from 153 percent to 107 percent. 
Total obligations lessened slightly, but the BER improved an estimated 10 
percent and the WPR also improved by 12 percentage-points, facilitated by the improved 
goal achievement rate.  These measures indicate performance improvement where the 
resources were concentrated, as VA achieved 80 percent of the performance measures 
that accounted for 86.7 percent of the obligations. 
The GPER remained steady at 63.4 as the decrease in the GCR mitigated 
the effect of increases in the WPR and goal achievement. 
f. Summary for Evaluation Period 
The performance summary table below indicates relatively steady 
performance in SG-3 during the five-year evaluation period.  Goal achievement had a 
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fairly tight range (between 60 percent and 73.3 percent), and the WPR shows a similar 
limit in dispersion (compared to the strategic goals evaluated previously).  Except for the 
large increase in 2004, the BER was generally stable throughout the period.  
Additionally, the GCR and GPER trends potentially reveal indications of slight 
performance improvement from 2002 to 2006. 
Strategic Goal 3 (SG-3) Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Goal Met 64.3% 63.6% 69.2% 60.0% 73.3% 
WPR 70.3% 69.1% 84.4% 68.7% 80.8% 
BER $11.796B $12.588B $19.699B $9.960B $10.894B 
GCR N/A 70% 108.7% 153.2% 107.0% 
GPER 45.2 30.8 58.5 63.2 63.4 
Table 68.   VA Strategic Goal 3 Performance Summary 



























Figure 20.   VA Strategic Goal 3 Performance Graph 
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4. Strategic Goal 4 (SG-4) 
a. Performance Year 2002 
Strategic goal four (SG-4) states the VA’s purpose to “Contribute to the 
public health, emergency management, socioeconomic well-being, and history of the 
Nation.”96  This goal accounted for only 1.6 percent, or $943M, of total VA obligations 
for 2002.  The goal is supported by five objectives:97 
• Improve the Nation’s preparedness for response to war, terrorism, national 
emergencies, and natural disasters by developing plans and taking actions 
to ensure continued service to veterans as well as support to national, state, 
and local emergency management and homeland security efforts.  There 
were no obligations related to this objective (no devoted VA resources). 
• Advance VA medical research and development programs that address 
veterans’ needs, with an emphasis on service-connected injuries and 
illnesses, and contribute to the Nation’s knowledge of disease and 
disability.  This objective accounts for eight-tenths of one percent of VA 
resources. 
• Sustain partnerships with the academic community that enhance the 
quality of care to veterans and provide high quality educational 
experiences for health care trainees.  This objective accounts for seven-
tenths of one percent of VA resources. 
• Enhance the socioeconomic well-being of veterans, and thereby the Nation 
and local communities, through veterans’ benefits; assistance programs for 
small, disadvantaged, and veteran-owned businesses; and other 
community initiatives.  This objective accounts for less than one million 
dollars of VA resources (zero percent, rounded). 
• Ensure that national cemeteries are maintained as shrines dedicated to 
preserving our Nation’s history, nurturing patriotism, and honoring the 
service and sacrifice veterans have made.  This objective accounts for one-
tenth of one percent of VA resources. 
 
 
                                                 
96 Department of Veterans Affairs, FY 2002 Performance and Accountability Report, January 2003, 9. 
97 Ibid., 88. 
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VA’s SG-4 was an unusual strategic goal, as it had only two performance 
measurements with established targets in 2002; three of the five objectives did not have 
related performance measures.  VA achieved both of its established measures, which 
enabled a 54.9 percent WPR and $518M BER on its meager obligation total.  The GPER 
was 54.9. 
b. Performance Year 2003 
The GPER dropped to 21.9 in 2003, influenced by the initial GCR of 94.4 
percent and the goal achievement rate, which dropped in half from 2002, falling to 50 
percent.  It should be noted that the performance measurement target for SG-4.5 was 
increased from 96 percent to 98 percent, a very aggressive goal when attempting to 
satisfy the needs of grieving families.  The targeted satisfaction rate would have been 
surpassed at the previous rate.  (VA was actively developing performance targets for SG-
4 in 2003.) 
The WPR was basically stable at 46.4 percent, and the BER was still 
minor at $463M. 
c. Performance Year 2004 
The GCD was plus four as VA established several performance 
measurements for SG-4 in 2004.  VA achieved 50 percent of its six measurements, 
enabling it to attain a 56.5 percent WPR and $587M BER with its slightly increased 
obligation total (up 10 percent).  The additional performance goals and larger budget 
boosted the GCR by 46.2 percentage points to 140.6 percent, and the GPER also rose 
slightly to 28.3. 
d. Performance Year 2005 
The budget rose by 36 percent in 2005, but the BER dropped by 17.7 
percent to $483M as VA failed to achieve the performance target that benefited most 
from the increased budget (SG-4.3).  The GCR dropped by 54 percent to 63.9 percent, 
and the GPER was 10.9 after a 61.4 percent decline. 
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This year’s measures indicate a general decline in performance and 
ineffective use of allotted resources. 
e. Performance Year 2006 
The GCR and GPER both increased substantially in 2006, to 92.4 percent 
and 42.4, respectively.  Though VA still achieved only 50 percent of its six established 
performance targets, it managed to accomplish the goals that accounted for the bulk of 
the budget (92 percent), which corresponded to a 91.8 percent BER. 
f. Summary for Evaluation Period 
The summary table below does not reveal conspicuous performance 
improvement during the evaluation period.  The goal achievement rate remains at 50 
percent after the decline from 100 percent in 2002, and the GPER indicates a largely 
declining trend.  Performance is generally mediocre, except for the noticeable increase in 
the WPR and GPER for 2006.  
 
 Strategic Goal 4 (SG-4) Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Goal Met 100% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
WPR 54.9% 46.4% 56.5% 34.2% 91.8% 
BER $518M $463M $587M $483M $1.397B 
GCR N/A 94.4% 140.6% 63.9% 92.4% 
GPER 54.9 21.9 28.3 10.9 42.4 
Table 69.   VA Strategic Goal 4 Performance Summary 
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Figure 21.   VA Strategic Goal 4 Performance Graph 
5. Enabling Goal (SG-5) 
a. Performance Year 2002 
The enabling goal (SG-5) states VA’s determination to “Deliver world-
class service to veterans and their families by applying sound business principles that 
result in effective management of people, communications, technology and governance.”  
This goal accounted for only one percent, or $560M, of total VA obligations for 2002.  
The goal is supported by four objectives:98 
• Recruit, develop, and retain a competent, committed, and diverse 
workforce that provides high quality service to veterans and their families.  
This objective accounts for two-tenths of one percent of VA resources. 
• Improve communications with veterans, employees, and stakeholders 
about the Department’s mission, goals, and current performance as well as 
the benefits and services VA provides.  This objective accounts for only 
$14M, less than one-tenth of one percent of VA resources. 
                                                 
98 Department of Veterans Affairs, FY 2002 Performance and Accountability Report, January 2003, 
99. 
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• Implement a One VA information technology framework that supports the 
integration of information across business lines and that provides a source 
of consistent, reliable, accurate, and secure information to veterans and 
their families, employees, and stakeholders.  This objective accounts for 
one-tenth of one percent of VA resources. 
• Improve the overall governance and performance of VA by applying 
sound business principles, ensuring accountability, and enhancing our 
management of resources through improved capital asset management; 
acquisition and competitive sourcing; and linking strategic planning, 
budgeting, and performance planning.  This objective accounts for seven-
tenths of one percent of VA resources. 
The enabling goal is unlike the four strategic goals in that it focuses on 
“crosscutting activities that enable all organizational elements to carry out the 
Department’s mission.”99  It does not center on activities that deliver outcomes/outputs to 
VA beneficiaries, and therefore has a comparatively small budget and no performance 
measurements in 2002. 
b. Performance Year 2003 
Three of the four enabling goal objectives did not have corresponding 
performance measures in 2003.  VA achieved one of the two performance measurement 
targets established for SG-5.4, leading to a BER of $326M on its total budget of $852M, 
as well as a WPR of 38.2 percent. 
It was not possible to calculate a GCR or GPER for 2003 because of the 
absence of performance measures in 2002.  The calculations were not feasible due to a 
zero in the formula’s denominator. 
c. Performance Year 2004 
The GCD was plus five in 2004 as VA established numerous performance 
measurements, leading to an immense GCR of 344.7 percent.  The high GCR gives credit 
to VA for establishing measures to which the agency can hold itself accountable, as 
required by GPRA.   
                                                 
99 Department of Veterans Affairs, FY 2002 Performance and Accountability Report, January 2003, 
99. 
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VA accomplished 42.9 percent of its seven measurements, including one 
of its five new targets, enabling the department to attain a 73.2 percent WPR and $657M 
BER.  The achievement of the additional performance goal contributed $41M to the 
BER.  The GPER was established at 31.4. 
d. Performance Year 2005 
The GCD for 2005 was minus three as VA eliminated several performance 
measuremes.  That decision, coupled with a 200 percent increase in obligations, 
drastically decreased the GCR by 487.9 percentage points to -143.2 percent. 
VA replaced the two SG-5.1 performance measures it achieved in 2004 
with one performance measurement with an entirely different focus for 2005.  
Additionally, the multi-year business-line transformation related to SG-5.2 was an 
established target, but not expected to be achieved in 2005. 
VA accomplished two of its four performance goals in 2005, enabling an 
87.4 percent WPR and BER of $2.355B, compared to actual obligations of $2.694B. 
The strength of the WPR was eliminated by the radically low GCR, 
establishing a GPER of -62.6. 
e. Performance Year 2006 
The GCR and GPER both rebounded substantially in 2006, jumping to 
160.5 percent and 277.5, respectively.  These increases were driven by the addition of 
three performance measurements and the accomplishment of 85.7 percent of total 
measurement goals.  This high achievement, coupled with a significant budget increase to 
$3.085B (14.5 percent), led to a WPR of 201.7 percent, which is a 131 percent 
improvement from 2005.  The BER also reached $3.069B. 
f. Summary for Evaluation Period 
The summary table below indicates potential trends of performance 
improvement during the evaluation period.  The goal achievement rate improved the last 
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three years, but it was at or below 50 percent for most of the five-year evaluation period.  
The GPER also fluctuated wildly the last three years, but closed the period with a 
substantially high number.  The WPR and GCR benefited appreciably from a generously 
increasing budget throughout the period.  Performance is not particularly strong, and the 
measures are exaggerated by performance goal modifications.  The performance in SG-5 
shows improvement in effectiveness, but the erratic nature of that improvement warrants 
cautious skepticism. 
 
Enabling Goal (SG-5) Performance Summary 
Tool/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% Goal Met 25.0% 16.7% 42.9% 50% 85.7% 
WPR 34.8% 35.9% 73.2% 87.4% 201.7% 
BER $12.820B $14.850B $657M $2.355B $3.069B 
GCR N/A 137.5% 344.7% -143.2% 160.5% 
GPER 8.7 8.2 31.4 -62.6 277.5 
Table 70.   VA Enabling Goal Performance Summary 
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Figure 22.   VA Enabling Goal Performance Graph 
C. CONCLUSION 
The analysis did not reveal clear indications of material improvement in program 
effectiveness during the evaluation period.  Using this project’s various analysis tools to 
evaluate VA’s performance, it appears the department’s overall performance actually 
decreased from 2002 to 2006, even though some objectives revealed positive trends.  A 
review of selected performance analysis measures supports this conclusion. 
VA’s key performance goal achievement rate ranged from a high of 77 percent in 
2002 to a low of 58 percent in 2005 before closing the evaluation period at 65 percent, for 
an average completion rate of 63.9 percent.  Though the rate in the final year was the 
second-highest of the five-year period, the rate decreased in three of the four transition 
years (2003 through 2006).  This does not clearly demonstrate material improvement for 
critical performance measures.   
It should be noted that VA did make progress toward achieving established targets 
even though many key performance goals were not achieved in consecutive years.  The  
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analysis may show that VA failed to achieve the performance measure, but the 
department’s actual performance in the activity did improve, (and still fell short of the 
established target).   
In some instances, VA failed to achieve a target, but the department actually 
increased the performance expectation by making the target even more stringent (more 
demanding) for the next year’s performance period.  Although, these improvement 
achievements are not revealed in the concrete rates of the project’s performance analysis 
tools, VA should be credited with attempting to better serve its constituents and 
beneficiaries with a higher level of service in the long run.   
VA also improved performance in some activities that were already achieving 
established targets.  Again, VA should be credited in these instances for its apparent 
emphasis on continuous improvement.  However, VA’s overall rate of performance 
improvement declines steadily each year from 74 percent in 2002 to 48 percent in 2006.  
As mentioned earlier, the notes in each objective’s performance matrix should be 
reviewed for additional details about notable performance measurements. The table 













Key Performance Goals (KPG) Achievement (VA standards) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
KPG (#) 23 27 22 24 23 
KPG met 17 16 13 14 16 
KPG not met 6 11 9 10 7 
% KPG met 77% 64% 59% 58% 65% 
KPG met and 
improved 
15 12 10 8 9 
KPG not met 
but improved 




74% 70% 64% 50% 48% 
Table 71.   VA Key Performance Goal Achievement Summary 
The GPER is a general measure of increasing or decreasing performance, and 
takes into account the impact of achieved goals, consistency in the number of goals, and 
the perceived importance of the goals.  Though VA’s GPER measures were generally 
quite volatile from year to year, SG-3 and SG-4 demonstrated the most stable 
performance, with SG-3 demonstrating the most perceived performance improvement, 
but the measures for SG-2 and SG-4 actually decreased from the start of the evaluation 
period to the end in 2006.  As a whole, the organization’s GPER rate does not indicate 
consistent material improvement during the evaluation period.  The table below 




GPER Performance Summary 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SG-1 8.7 8.2 18.1 6.2 63.1 
SG-2 78.3 112.6 10.9 3.6 39.9 
SG-3 45.2 30.8 58.5 63.2 63.4 
SG-4 54.9 21.9 28.3 10.9 42.4 
SG-5 8.7 8.2 31.4 -62.6 277.5 
Table 72.   VA GPER Performance Summary 
The WPR attempts to relate the weighted importance of each goal with the 
resources used to accomplish that goal.  It essentially addresses resource effectiveness in 
operations.  A higher measure infers that the organization is using its resources more 
effectively in meeting its goals.  SG-1 demonstrated the most stable WPR and SG-3 
carried the highest average WPR, and the WPR in 2006 was significantly higher than 
previous years for every strategic goal.  Though the WPR measure reveals some positive 
trends for three of the goals, from the initial measure in 2002, the WPR did not reveal 
clear indications of material improvement in effectiveness for VA.  The table below 









WPR Performance Summary 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SG-1 34.9% 35.9% 32.5% 39.9% 99.3% 
SG-2 78.3% 89.9% 32.6% 52.6% 60.5% 
SG-3 70.3% 69.1% 84.4% 68.7% 80.8% 
SG-4 54.9% 46.4% 56.5% 34.2% 91.8% 
SG-5 34.8% 35.9% 73.2% 87.4% 201.7% 
Table 73.   VA WPR Performance Summary 
The BER attempts to show the program’s ‘bang for the buck’ by deriving a dollar 
figure related to the total goals achieved, and provides the relative amount of resources 
applied to achieved goals.  The reader can compare the BER to the specific goal’s total 
obligations, along with the WPR, to see how effectively VA applied its resources.  VA’s 
SG-1 and SG-3 performed strongest via the BER measure, with each year except one 
showing an increase.  Overall, a clear indication of consistent improvement is not evident 
in the VA’s BER measures, however.  The table below summarizes BER performance. 
 
BER Performance Summary 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SG-1 $12.820B $14.850B $13.484B $20.481B $55.723B 
SG-2 $2.631B $3.333B $1.069B $3.103B $2.621B 
SG-3 $11.796B $12.588B $19.699B $9.960B $10.894B 
SG-4 $518M $463M $587M $483M $1.397B 
SG-5 $12.820B $14.850B $657M $2.355B $3.069B 
Table 74.   VA BER Performance Summary 
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Though some indications of performance improvement did exist, the evaluation of 
VA’s performance and accountability reports using the developed analysis tools did not 
reveal material improvements in program effectiveness; the reporting requirements of 
















Table 77.   VA FY 2002 Strategic Goal 3 Performance Matrix 
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Table 79.   VA FY 2002 Enabling Goal  Performance Matrix 
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Table 81.   VA FY 2003 Strategic Goal 2 Performance Matrix 
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Table 82.   VA FY 2003 Strategic Goal 3 Performance Matrix 
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Table 83.   VA FY 2003 Strategic Goal 4 Performance Matrix 
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Table 99.   VA FY 2006 Enabling Goal Performance Matrix 
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VIII. PROJECT ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS 
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) was enacted to 
improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the federal 
government and to initiate program performance improvement.  The purpose of this 
analysis was to determine if the performance and accountability reports required by 
GPRA and submitted by agencies during the last five years revealed material 
improvements in program effectiveness and public accountability through reported 
results.  The project examined three executive agencies, each of which was performing at 
a different reporting proficiency, according to the performance and accountability 
scorecard produced by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, a non-
governmental citizen advocacy center. 
The analysis examined performance plans, performance reports and strategic 
plans from the previous five years to determine if the reports indicated improvements in 
program effectiveness and accountability over the five year evaluation period.  An 
evaluation tool was constructed to create a performance matrix based on the raw data in 
the agencies’ annual performance and accountability reports.  Six measures were used to 
evaluate the agencies’ performance from year to year. 
The analysis closely examined the performance of each agency using six main 
performance measurement tools, as described in detail in the methodology discussion.  A 
brief review of the tools is worthwhile. 
The Goal Performance Effectiveness Rating (GPER) incorporated the agency’s 
effectiveness at achieving its goals with the resources (budget) required to meet those 
goals, along with a goal stability factor.  This measure indicated improved performance 
effectiveness as it increased, and poorer performance as it decreased.   
The Weighted Performance Rating (WPR) combined the organization’s 
effectiveness at achieving its goals with the resources required to achieve those goals.  A 
larger measure indicated more effective use of resources.  The measure also helped the 
evaluator determine the relative importance between goals and objectives, as those goals 
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and objectives related to the program’s budget.  For example, an activity that achieved 80 
percent of its goals with a WPR of 32 percent would not have contributed as much 
towards the agency’s mission as an activity that achieved 30 percent of its goals with a 
WPR of 58 percent.   
The Budget Effectiveness Rating (BER) was closely related to the WPR in that it 
was also a factor of the activity’s resources and the goal achievement rate.  However, it 
provided a “stand alone” dollar figure for each activity, and did not relate the dollar to the 
overall goal’s total budget like the WPR.  The BER was a simple measure of how many 
dollars were used to achieve accomplished goals. 
Two tools were created to measure the organizations’ goal management efforts.  
The Goal Consistency Delta (GCD) simply provided the net change in the number of 
performance measures from year to year.  It did not track the real or cumulative changes, 
but noted only a change to the “bottom line” total number of performance measures.   
The Goal Consistency Rating (GCR) was a bit more complex than the GCD.  It 
measured the difference between a percentage change in the budget from year to year 
with a similar percentage change in the number of performance measures.  In other 
words, it related an increase or decrease in performance measures with increases or 
decreases in costs.  The GCR evaluated an entity’s resource use by indicating if the 
activity was doing more or less with its budget.  It was assumed a bigger budget would 
help the agency accomplish more, but that was not always the case. 
Finally, the analysis also measured the organizations’ goal effectiveness by 
determining the percentage of performance measurement targets the agencies actually 
accomplished.  The agency either achieved the targeted level of performance of it did not.  
No additional factor credit or weight was provided for improvements from previous 
years’ performance, whether the activity’s performance fell short of the target or 
surpassed the target.   
The methodology in this project does have limitations, including the project’s 
assumption of what constitutes material improvement in effectiveness, and the 
interpretation of the objectives’ relative importance.  Also, the evaluators in this study are 
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not subject matter experts in the organizations’ operational realm, but have only gleaned 
knowledge about the organizations through hours of research.  This study did not attempt 
to determine the relative appropriateness of any goal.  The agencies’ management teams 
know the relative importance of each goal, objective, and performance activity, and 
manage those targets accordingly by setting reasonable, challenging and achievable 
goals.  An additional point on performance improvement deserves more discussion. 
The analysis may have failed to acknowledge performance improvements by an 
agency as it worked toward achieving established goals.  Using the organization’s 
performance and accountability reports, the study determined whether or not the agency 
accomplished its stated goal.  If the agency fell short of the targeted performance level, it 
was deemed to have not successfully accomplished its goal.  This determination affected 
the calculation of two primary factors, the BER and the GPER.  These factors played a 
key role in the analysis and the overall determination of whether or not the agency 
demonstrated material improvements in program effectiveness.  But this determination 
may not be so clear-cut. 
The agency may have failed to achieve a goal, but it may have made great 
progress toward eventually achieving that goal through more effective business practices, 
better management, or some other efficiency or competency.  The performance and 
accountability reports discuss many activities in which performance improvements were 
achieved, even though the activity still fell short of a challenging goal.  Additionally, 
many goal targets were achieved, yet the organization continued to improve its measured 
performance, rather than settling on the achieved level of operation.  Because the basis 
for the specific tool was either ‘met or not met,’ these instances of performance 
improvement were not considered in the performance metrics calculations.  However, the 
analysis of performance and accountability reports did reveal other findings. 
The results of the analysis indicated material improvements in program 
effectiveness in one of the three agencies, but the other two agencies did not clearly 
indicate material improvements in program effectiveness.  Evidence of improved 
program effectiveness and accountability inferred that these improvements may be 
related to the accountability requirements of GPRA. 
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The Department of the Interior (DOI) showed indications of material 
improvements in program effectiveness.  For 2002-2003, DOI reported increased 
performance in the GPER measure in three of the six strategic goals.  However, efficient 
budget execution was clearly apparent in only one; the remaining goals achieved around 
the fifty percent range.  DOI did not alter its extremely alter its goals during this period, 
as only two goals saw moderate decreases in the number of performance measures. 
The 2004-2006 period demonstrated stronger performance through the analysis 
tools.  Three of DOI’s four mission areas revealed increasingly better performance year 
to year.  Mission Area 2 experienced a slight decrease in performance in 2005, but 
rebounded significantly the following year.  Mission Area 4 experienced decreased 
performance each year as its GCR and GPER ratings diverged.  Conversely, Mission 
Area 3 revealed a convergence of its GCR to the WPR and GPER ratings. 
DOI’s management measurement strategic goal performance increased from 2004 
to 2005, but tailed off in 2006.  Additionally, the Customer Value and Integration areas 
did not perform well during this period.   
According to the cumulative sum of the project’s analysis measures, DOI reported 
material improvements in program effectiveness from 2002 to 2006.  The results may 
infer that GPRA has been a catalyst for improved performance, transparency, and 
effectiveness for DOI.  
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did not reveal indications of 
material improvements in program effectiveness in its performance and accountability 
reports.  EPA’s reports were challenging to read, and reporting continuity was difficult 
from year to year as management changed goals, objectives and reporting formats often.  
For example, the number of goals dropped from five to ten between 2002 and 2003.   
Adding to the transparency challenge was EPA’s lack of data in many reporting 
periods.  The reports often stated that results for many of the performance measures were 
not available.  These negative reporting issues only validate EPA’s poor Mercatus 
Institute ranking for performance and accountability. 
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A summary look at EPA’s goal achievement rate throughout the evaluation period 
reveals declining performance for four of the five strategic goals.  SG-5’s achievement 
rate dropped most significantly from 80 percent in 2004 to only 13 percent in 2006.  SG-
4 demonstrated the most stability, but achieved only about 49 percent over the period.  
None of the strategic goals finished the evaluation period at a higher rate than the initial 
period. 
EPA failed to demonstrate any indication of improved effectiveness in its 
performance during the reporting period.  In general, every strategic goal except for SG-3 
demonstrated concrete evidence of decreasing effectiveness from 2002 to 2006.  For SG-
3, the only evaluation measure that showed a moderate increase in performance was the 
GPER rate, which started at 38.41, dipped to 7.03 in 2005, and closed at 45.43 in 2006.  
As a result, the analysis determined EPA did not reveal material improvements in 
program effectiveness and public accountability through its reported results. 
EPA’s GCR showed a trend to increase over time for most areas which indicate a 
positive trend even though the GPER was decreasing overall.   
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) performance and accountability reports 
were transparent and easy to read.  The reports maintained strong continuity year to year, 
and the provided detailed insight into the agency’s operations, successes and 
shortcomings.  However, the reports did not reveal material improvements in program 
effectiveness during the evaluation period.  Though several measures did improve from 
in certain years, the occurrence was rarely repeated from year to year for any of the five 
main performance measurement tools.   
The reports did reveal vacillating trends in the majority of the measures--the rates 
would increase one year, fall the next, and then rise dramatically again the following 
year.  The individual performance metrics tables and strategic goal summary tables 
clearly display these trends.  Again, the intent of this project was not to determine why or 
why not a certain level of performance was achieved, but to examine the reports for 
evidence of improved effectiveness. 
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Veterans Affairs showed reasonable performance in its goal achievement rate, 
with an average rate of 63.9 percent for its key performance goals.  However, the rate 
declined for three consecutive years (2003-2005) before climbing to 65 percent in 2006.  
As mentioned, the agency showed measured improvement in the performance of many 
activities, even though those activities fell short of goals.  That momentum declined 
noticeably as the evaluation period passed, though, starting at a high of 74 percent and 
falling to a low of 48 percent in 2006.   
Veterans Affairs’ goal-consistency related measures (GCD and GCR) were 
unremarkable, but leadership maintained a steady focus on consistent service delivery.  
VA did not demonstrate signs of wavering priorities or lack of vision by changing goals 
and objectives year to year.  The GCR for most of the evaluation period was relatively 
high, but there was goal fluctuation in many years.  However, VA often strengthened its 
goals by making targets more stringent.  It also replaced existing goals with new ones 
aimed at improving performance when reasonable and satisfactory levels of performance 
were consistently achieved for several years. 
VA demonstrated several instances of strong performance throughout the 
evaluation period.  As a general rule, however, those instances of improvements in 
program effectiveness were followed the next year by significant decreases in 
performance.  As a result, the analysis determined Veterans Affairs did not reveal 
material improvements in program effectiveness and public accountability through its 
reported results. 
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was enacted 14 years ago, 
and all major government agencies have developed strategic plans and submitted 
performance and accountability reports for at least seven years.  The act intended to 
improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the federal 
government, initiate program performance reform, and improve effectiveness and service 
delivery within the federal government.  However, this project’s analysis revealed that for 
two of the three agencies it examined, GPRA did not achieve its intended results.  
Therefore, the project’s research question--“Have the performance and accountability 
reports required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and submitted 
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by agencies during the last five years revealed material improvements in program 
effectiveness and public accountability through reported results?”--must be answered 
inconclusively when evaluating these three agencies.  An evaluation applying this model 
to all federal agencies may reveal a more conclusive finding. 
This analysis provides a solid beginning for further study of related areas in 
performance improvement and effectiveness within the government.  The performance 
matrix tool could be strengthened with additional measurement factors, making it more 
comprehensive to study other government agencies and future evaluation periods.  
Further research could also apply statistical analysis to correlate budget fluctuations with 
performance achievement.  Also, a study of the Program Assessment Rating Tool’s 
influence on performance effectiveness and resource allocations could be compared to 
the findings of this or similar studies. 
The applicability and value of this study comes from both the findings for these 
three organizations and from the confirmation that the performance of government 
agencies is being evaluated by other parties.  This form of oversight provides an incentive 
for agencies to improve their performance effectiveness; agencies are accountable to their 
stakeholders.   
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